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 1 
1 Introduction 
 The urgent existential crisis of global warming warrants an international response 
commanding broad and deep respect from states, institutions, interest groups, and the 
public.  To achieve such respect, necessary for the success of the struggle to save life on 
earth as we know it, the international response must have great legitimacy.  If the response 
fails a test of trust and believability, it’s success is unlikely.  It is thus crucial to consider 
the legitimacy of the ”flexibility mechanisms” – International Emissions Trading, Clean 
Development Mechanism, and Joint Implementation – made central to the international 
response by the Kyoto Protocol.1 
 In his 2008 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (”IPCC”) chair Rajendra Pachauri explained that ”we have a short window 
of time to bring about a reduction in global emissions” if global warming is to be kept 
within manageable parameters.2  Since then, it seems that climate change presents a yet 
more urgent crisis with each day of news.3  The first ”key message” of a 2009 congress of 
top climate scientists begins soberly and representatively:  ”Recent observations confirm 
that, given high rates of observed emissions, the worst case IPCC scenario trajectories (or 
even worse) are being realized.”4  Reports are getting rather dramatic.  In April 2009, 
scientists watched an Antarctic ice sheet the size of Northern Ireland ”explode[] from the 
                                               
1 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 16, 1998 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
2 R.K. Pachauri, Chairman of the IPCC, Nobel Lecture, (Dec. 10, 2007) 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ipcc-lecture_en.html 
3 E.g., AMANDA STAUDT, NEW SCIENCE DEMONSTRATES NEED FOR AGGRESSIVE CAP ON CARBON 
POLLUTION, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, Mar. 20, 2009 (highlighting recent scientific reports 
concerning predictions of increased sea level rise rates, forest mortality, arctic sea ice melt rates, and 
longevity of CO2 global warming capacity). 
4 Press release, International Scientific Conference on Climate Change, Key Messages from the Congress 
(Mar. 12, 2009) http://climatecongress.ku.dk/newsroom/congress_key_messages/. 
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center outwards,” as they fretted about the ”staggering rate of warming” now observed at 
the earth’s poles and potential sea level rise consequences.5 
 To stop more substanial global warming and resulting dire consequences, societies 
must transition from the past two centuries’ carbon energy basis to a cleaner one involving 
drastically reduced greenhouse gas emissions.  This idea – that effective climate change 
mitigation essentially requires figuring out how to leave fossil fuels in the ground – is 
widely recognized and accepted.6  Indeed, according to the United States Secretary of 
Energy, a science and technology ”revolution” is needed.7 
 The three flexibility mechanisms, International Emissions Trading, Clean 
Development Mechanism, and Joint Implementation, form the heart of Kyoto’s scheme to 
reduce greenhouse gas levels by reducing anthropogenic emissions and enhancing 
removals.  Yes, developed nations have agreed to emissions caps under Kyoto, but the 
flexibility mechanisms bring the meaning of these into question.  If these mechanisms lack 
legitimacy – i.e., if they are not respected, trusted, and known to be valid – there is a very 
good chance that the international global warming mitigation effort will fail.  The concept 
of legitimacy in this context essentially involves central questions:  Why abide by and 
respect international legal institutions?  Why take them seriously? 
 The subject of this thesis is the legitimacy of Joint Implementation (”JI”).  Can the 
deficiencies faced by JI be effectively addressed so that JI can be retained with adequate 
legitimacy? 
 While the legitimacy of International Emissions Trading (”IET”) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (”CDM”) are at least as important and topical as JI’s, to allow for 
a more detailed treatment of the flexibility mechanism that has received the least attention 
in legal literature, this thesis will be limited to JI in specific and detailed discussions.  
                                               
5 Fiona Harvey, Ice loss sparks new climate change fears, Financial Times, Apr. 10, 2009. 
6 E.g., Richard Black, ‘Safe’ climate means ‘no to coal,’ BBC News, Apr. 29, 2009; Fiona Harvey, Climate 
scientists warn of looming disaster, Financial Times, Apr. 29, 2009. 
7 John M. Broder and Matthew L. Wald, Big science role is seen in global warming cure, New York Times, 
Feb. 11, 2009 (Sec. Stephen Chu specified that “Nobel-level” breakthroughs are needed in three areas: 
electric batteries, solar power, and the development of new crops that can be turned into fuel.). 
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However, many of the propositions and ideas set forward are also applicable to IET and 
CDM.  When so more widely applicable, the issues may be discussed in a broader context. 
 Section 2 explores the concept of legitimacy, its components and meaning.  Section 
3 explains JI, and section 4 its problems, particularly in relationship to legitimacy.  Section 
5 addresses how and whether JI can be fixed to close its legitimacy gap.  Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Legitimacy 
2.1 Why legitimacy matters 
 Legitimacy is the foundation of governmental power, and ”involves the capacity of 
a political system to engender and maintain the belief that exisiting political institutions are 
the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.”8  Questions about the legitimacy in 
international law, its institutions and mechanism, are questions about the ”moral force of 
international law.”9  ”Legitimacy concerns the justification of authority; it provides 
grounds for deferring to another’s decision, even in the absence of coercion or rational 
persuasion.”10  Without sufficient legitimacy, there is no moral duty of obedience to 
international law by nations, organizations, or people.  Degrees of legitimacy and of such 
moral duty rise or fall correspondingly. 
 Questions about the legitimacy of international law institutions are receiving 
increasing attention as these institutions gain more authority and the consensual nature of 
their activities diminishes.11  For example, Kyoto and WTO treaties create institutions with 
significant policymaking and enforcement authorities that can effectively require state 
action  unforeseen at the time of treatymaking.  The western world’s strongest and most 
common source of legitimacy, democracy, is not really available in the context of 
                                               
8 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 64 (expanded ed., Heinemann 
1983).  
9 Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 907, 908 (2005). 
10 Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 596, 603 (1999). 
11 Id. at 597. 
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international law.12  Democracy means different things to different people, including (or 
not including) equal rights under rule of law, accountability, protection of human rights, 
free and open debate, public participation, and other values.  However, the core of 
democracy, majority rule as manifested in free elections with universal participation, is 
inapplicable to international law and its institutions. 
 ”Legitimacy” is distinct from ”lawful.”  A thing can be legal (lawful) but 
illegitimate, e.g., an immoral law.  Also, a thing can be legitimate but unlawful, as in, for 
example, an act of civil disobedience or the popular overthrow of a despotic regime.  The 
issue here is not whether the flexibility mechanisms are lawful, bur rather to what extent 
they are legitimate, i.e., to what extent are they appropriate and proper. 
 Successful global warming mitigation requires participation of all major sectors of 
society.  The challenge demands a major transition and evolution in how people live and 
work and how economies and societies function.  Developed countries must act swiftly and 
decisively, enacting legislation to substantially reduce emissions and funding programs 
effective to bring about this objective.  Citizens of these countries may have to make 
sacrifices.  Certainly they will need to face significant changes in the priorities of their 
daily worlds.  Developing countries must also prioritize low-emission development now.  
Wealthy nations must provide them with financial and technical support for this.  
Corporations and other private sector institutions must earnestly engage to take into 
account long term common good to an unprecedented degree.  People must support these 
efforts, accept lifestyle changes, and demand that the necessary transitions be made.13 
 International cooperation is an essential part of this mitigation effort because the 
atmosphere is a global commons and because of the potential for free riding nations to be 
                                               
12 Id. at 600 and 615 – 617; Jost Delbruck, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational 
Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 29, 37 (2003). 
13 Recent sociological research indicates that human attitudes towards global warming can worsen the 
problem.  “Apathetic and hostile responses to climate change, in other words, produce a feedback loop and 
reinforce the process of global warming.”  John Gertner, Why isn’t the brain green?, New York Times, Apr. 
16, 2009.  It is no great leap to think that people’s feelings about the international climate change legal regime 
would affect their attitudes towards global warming in this context. 
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spoilers.14  Thus, the international legal regime for global warming, first formalized in 1992 
with the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (”UNFCCC”), will 
have a crucial central role. 
 It may well be that the degree of mitigation success will correspond with the level 
of legitimacy held by the mechanisms and institutions of the international climate change 
regime.  Global warming mitigation demands a lot of us all.  If the heart of the regime, at 
which currently lie the flexibility mechanisms, lacks legitimacy, it remains highly doubtful 
that states, institutions, or peoples will feel obliged to meet the challenge.  Few will believe 
in or abide by that which lacks moral force. 
2.2 What legitimacy is 
 In the context of institutions and devices of international law such as the Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms, it is useful to consider two aspects of legitimacy.  The first, 
procedural legitimacy, or input legitimacy, encompasses notions of fairness, transparency, 
democracy, and rule of law in the working of the mechanism at issue.  The second, 
substantive legitimacy, or output legitimacy, concerns the outcomes of the mechanisms.  
The questions in this aspect are about how effective is a mechanism in achieving its 
objective, and in respecting human rights and relevant principles of international law. 
 In a sense, these two aspects of legitimacy correspond to bundles of principles of 
international law.  A principle of international law guides the formation, interpretation, and 
implementation of rules, such as the provisions governing the flexibility mechanisms.   
A ’rule’ ... ’is essentially practical and, moreover, binding ... 
[T]here are rules of art as there are rules of government’ 
while a principle ’expresses a general truth, which guides our 
action, serves as a theoretical basis for the various acts of our 
life, and the application of which to reality produces a given 
consequence.15 
                                               
14 Jouni Paavola, Governing atmospheric sinks: the architecture of entitlements in the global commons, 2 Int’l 
J. of the Commons 313 (2008); Developments in the Law – International Environmental Law, 104 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1484, 1536 (1991) (characterizing the atmosphere and the global climate as “true commons,” the 
international regulation of which poses “serious hold-out and free rider problems”). 
15 PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 233 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2003) (citing Gentini case (Italy v. Venezuela) M.C.C. (1903)); see also, Hans Christian Bugge, The 
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2.2.1 Procedural legitimacy 
 As noted above, procedural legitimacy encompasses notions of fairness, 
transparency, democracy, and rule of law.  To be considered legitimate, mechanisms 
established by international law must be open and the rules must be known, 
understandable, and followed.  Compliance must be verifiable.  People must be able to ask 
questions and raise concerns and these must be considered and addressed.  Those holding 
power and making decisions must be accountable. 
 Public participation is essential to procedural legitimacy.16  Indeed, public 
participation may be the aspect of democracy that is most readily applicable to institutions 
of international law.17  It is important not only in its own right, but also as a means to 
improve decision-making in furtherance of sustainable development and environmental 
integrity.18 
 Reflecting its acceptance as a modern norm of international governance, public 
participation is written into the UNFCCC, albeit only in the sort of general terms familiar 
to students of international conventions.  Parties commit to ”[p]romote and cooperate in 
education, training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the 
widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations.”19  
In carrying out this commitment, parties must ”promote and facilitate ... [p]ublic access to 
information on climate change and its effects [and] [p]ublic participation in addressing 
climate change and its effects and developing adequate responses.”20   
                                                                                                                                               
Principle of “Polluter Pays” in ECONOMICS AND LAW, IN LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 53, 73 
– 74 (Erlikng Eide and Roger van den Bergh eds., Juridisk Forlag 1996).  
16 David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 Iowa 
Law Review 769, 802 (1994); Jonas Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participation in International 
Environmental Law, 8 Yearbook of Int’l Envt’l L. 51, 62 (1997).  Providing legitimacy is one of the bases of 
the principle of public participation.  Id. at 75 – 81.   
17 Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 596, 614 (1999). 
18 Ebbesson, supra note 16, at 68 – 69. 
19 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4(1)(i), May 9, 1992 [hereinafter 
UNFCCC]. 
20 Id. art. 6(a). 
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 Fleshing out the principle of public participation in the context of procedural 
legitimacy means looking beyond this UNFCCC language.  A right to environmental 
information has grown from efforts to advance human rights.21  The 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development directs not only appropriate access to environmental 
information, but also the opportunity for the public to participate in environmental 
decision-making processes and accompanying judicial review, as well as the 
encouragement by governments of public environmental awareness and participation.22 
 The 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (”Aarhus Convention”) is the most 
recent and complete statement of the imperatives of the principle of public participation.23  
Because of treaty overlap, Aarhus parties must satisfy its requirements in fulfillment of 
UNFCCC public participation directives, and other UNFCCC parties have looked to 
Aarhus for guidance.24  To enhance the impact of public participation, Aarhus sets out five 
means: 1) early public participation, while many options remain open; 2) early information 
to the public about the participation process and the nature of decision-making; 3) 
provision for the public’s submission of comments; 4) requirement that the decision-maker 
take due account of public input; and 5) the right to have the decision reviewed by a 
court.25   
                                               
21 Benjamin W. Cramer, The Human Right to Information, the Environment and Information about the 
Environment: From the Universal Declaration to the Aarhus Convention, 14 Comm. Law and Policy 73 
(2009); Ebbesson, supra note 16, at 69 – 75 (citing rights to political participation, for indigenous peoples, to 
a fair trial, and to information). 
22 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development principle 10, Jun. 14, 1992 [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]; see also, World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7 (1082), principle 23, Oct. 28, 1982. 
23 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters, Jun. 25, 1998 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. 
24 Jeremy Wates, The Aarhus Convention as a tool for enhancing the role of the public in tackling climate 
change, European Regional Workshop on Article 6 of the UNFCCC, May 2009, 
http://www.swedishepa.se/en/In-English/Menu/ (search Jeremy Wates); UN Economic Commission for 
Europe, Climate information showcased at workshop in Stockholm, May 28, 2009, 
http://aarhusclearinghouse.unece.org/news.cfm?id=1000327. 
25 Ebbesson, supra note 16, at 86. 
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 In addition to the Aarhus Convention and the 1992 Rio Declaration, environmental 
impact assessment is required by a large number of treaties and international instruments.26  
International Court of Justice opinions indicate that EIA preparation may be an emerging 
requirement of customary international law.27 
 Other instruments of international law also facilitate sccess to justice in the form of 
a non-governmental right to go to court for environmental protection.28  These include both 
human rights conventions and specific international environmental law conventions.29  The 
most advanced treaty on EIA is the Convention on Environmental Impact Assesment in a 
Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention).  It prescribes with substantial detail the 
minimum requirements that an EIA document must satisfy and applies to ”activities with 
linkages to climate change” undertaken by Espoo parties.30 
                                               
26 Rio Declaration; e.g., UN Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 206, Oct. 7, 1982; Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 8 & annex I, Oct. 4, 1991; Kuwait Regional Convention 
for the Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution (Persian Gulf) art. IX, Apr. 
1978; Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean 
Region, Mar. 24, 1983; Ebbesson, supra note 16, at 87 (listing additional treaty examples). 
27 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) I.C.J. Rep. 1997 (Sept. 25) at 111 – 113 (J. Weeramantry 
separate opinion); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) I.C.J. Rep. 1995 (Sept. 22)  144 – 45 (J. Weeramantry 
dissenting opinion). 
28 Ebbesson, supra note 16, at 74 and 81 – 87. 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 10, Dec. 10, 1948; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 14, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), Mar. 23, 1976; European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, ETS no. 005, Mar. 9, 1953; American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 8, Jul. 18, 1978; Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jul. 
29, 1960, as amended Jan. 28, 1964; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 
1963; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969; International 
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea, May 6, 1996; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Jun. 21, 1933.   
30 Convention on Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context art. 4(1) and annex II, Sept. 10, 1997; 
ECE Guidance on the Practical Application of the Espoo Convention, § 2.4, ¶ 26 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2006/eia/ece.mp.eia.8.pdf. 
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 Based on the Aarhus Convention and other international documents on the subject, 
public participation processes should include basic elements: 
First, the process should provide a true opportunity for the 
public to take part in decisionmaking, offering it a possibility 
to influence the outcome.  Second, it should reflect a broad 
understanding of who may act to protect the ’public interests’ 
– the premise being that not only governmental and 
administrative institutions should do so.  Third, the 
decisionmaking process, as well as the follow-up monitoring 
of any implementation measures, should be transparent and 
open.  Fourth, the public at large should have access to 
environmental information.  Fifth, it should allow for legal 
review and the right to appeal.31 
 Transparency can be considered an emerging princple of international law and is 
also tied to procedural legitimacy.32  Transparency is 
the availability and accessibility of knowledge and 
information about: (1) the meaning of norms, rules, and 
procedures established by the treaty and practice of the 
regime, and (2) the policies and activities of parties to the 
treaty and of any central organs of the regime as to matters 
relevant to treaty compliance and regime efficacy.33 
 It is not reasonable to expect anyone to consider legitimate that which is not 
transparent.  Lack of transparency breeds distrust and incoordination, and creates space for 
misfeasance and malfeasance.  This is especially so if safeguards against conflicts of 
interest are weak.  Furthermore, transparency facilitates accountability by allowing media 
and other non-state actors to provide critiques that can force constructive reaction.34 
 The precautionary principle is another piece of procedural legitimacy, and it is 
widely accepted as a general principle of international environmental law.35  According to 
Philippe Sands, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration ”defines the core of the precautionary 
                                               
31 Ebbesson, supra note 16, at 59. 
32 Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Transparency: An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle in International 
Economic Law, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 579, 580 – 81 (2006); Delbruck, supra note 12, at 42. 
33 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 135 (1995). 
34 Delbruck, supra note 32, at 42 – 43. 
35 ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
34 (Kluwer Law International 2002). 
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principle.”36  This provides, ”[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.”  UNFCCC Article 3(3) includes similar 
wording as it directs the use of ”precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize 
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.”   
 While there is no widespread agreement on a precise definition of the precautionary 
principle, nor on its practical requirements, a number of core elements can be inferred from 
state practice: ”in the presence of a threat of (non-negligible) environmental harm 
accompanied by scientific uncertainty, regulatory action should nevertheless be taken to 
prevent or remedy the hazard concerned.”37  Among the measures associated with the 
principle are a shifting of the burden of proof and use of conservative evidentiary 
presumptions.38  Indeed, ”[m]ost commentators agree that in cases of uncertainty about the 
effects of a human-induced development, one of the most consistent applications of the 
precautionary principle would entail the placing of the burden of proving that the activity in 
question will not cause unacceptable environmental damage on its proponents before 
allowing it to proceed, instead of requiring its opponents to show that it will before 
cancelling or adapting it.”39  In this context, the requirement of proof is not absolute 
certainty, but generally something like ”’a high level of probability’ that no serious or 
irreversible damage will occur.”40   
                                               
36 Sands, supra note 15, at __. 
37 TROUWBORST, supra note 35, at 51 – 52. 
38 Id. at 52. 
39 Id. at 14 – 15; see also, e.g., World Charter for Nature, supra note 22, para. 11(b). 
40 TROUWBORST, supra note 35, at 15. 
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2.2.2  Substantive legitimacy 
 A primary principle of substantive legitimacy is effectiveness: how well 
mechanisms or institutions of international law accomplish the law’s objective, which, for 
the the UNFCCC, is stated in its Article 2:  
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related 
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may 
adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stablization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.  Such a level should be achieved within a 
time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
in a sustainable manner. 
 The ”level [of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere] that would prevent 
dangerous anthroponenic interference with the climate system” is debated, with more than 
a 2º C rise considered dangerous.41  A range of concentrations (expressed in parts per 
million (”ppm”) of carbon dioxide equivalent (”CO2e”)) necessary to stay below this 
threshold with varying degrees of probability are provided by different sources.  The Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change, completed in 2006, suggests a stabilization 
target level within the range 450 to 550 ppm.42  In 2008, leading climate scientist, NASA’s 
James Hansen, suggested a target stabilization level of 350 ppm, which would represent a 
reduction from the approximate current 385 ppm.43  There are well-reasoned calls for 
stabilization at 300 ppm.44   
 However, here two observations are most important.  First, stabilization requires 
nothing less than prompt and radical reductions in net emissions of greenhouse gases.  At 
                                               
41 E.g., Council of the European Union, Information note 7242/05, Mar. 11, 2005 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st07/st07242.en05.pdf. 
42 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter Stern 
Review].   
43 James Hansen, et al, Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, Apr. 7, 2008, 
http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/abstracts/2008/Hansen_etal.html. 
44 PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH CENTER, CLIMATE SAFETY 17 (2008), http://www.climatesafety.org/. 
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the conservative end of estimates, a cut in emissions to less than 20% of 2005 levels is 
ultimately required, and global emissions must drop by around 25% from 2005 levels by 
2050. 45  Others suggest that to attain stabilization at lower than 450 ppm, global cuts of 
more than 85% by 2050 are necessary.46  Cuts must be rapid, providing for a peak in 
emssions within the next couple of decades to avoid a need for yet more drastic cuts in the 
future, as well as higher risks of climate impacts.47  Recent studies evaluating cumulative 
emissions conclude that we can use only about one-quarter of the remaining fossil fuel 
reserves to keep the chance of exceeding a 2º C temperature rise by 2050 at 25%.48 
 Second, since the third paragraph of the UNFCCC’s preamble specifically notes 
that ”the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow ...,” 
necessarily implying that the share of emissions from developed countries will decline, the 
Article 2 objective can only be read to mean that the most drastic emissions reductions 
must occur in developed countries and that economic growth must be decoupled from 
greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries.49   
 How well the flexibility mechanisms act to level off greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere may be their ultimate measure. However, ”environmental integrity,” 
another principle within the framework of substantive legitimacy, means delivering ”real 
climate benefits without causing other environmental damages.”50  If people and the 
ecosystems upon which they depend suffer as a result of activities ostensibly undertaken to 
mitigate global warming, backlash would not be unreasonable. 
                                               
45 Stern Review at 225 – 228. 
46 PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 44, at 21. 
47 Stern Review at 225 – 233. 
48 Black, supra note 6.   
49 Christina Voigt, Climate Change and the Mandate of Sustainable Development: Observations from a Legal 
Perspective, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 547, 560, (Hans 
Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt eds., Europa Law Publishing 2008). 
50 Christina Voigt, Is the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable? Some Critical Aspects, 8 Sustainable 
Dev. L. and Pol’y 15, 15 – 16 (2008) (defining environmental integrity): see also, Ernestine Meijer and Jacob 
Werksman, CDM – concepts, requirements and project cycle, Keeping it clean: safeguarding the 
environmental integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism, 2 Envt’l Liability 81, 82 (2007). 
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 A crucial principle of international environmental law is sustainable development 
and it too must be considered part of substantive legitimacy.  Not only does UNFCCC 
Article 2 refer to enabling ”economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner,” but 
both the right and duty to promote sustainable development and a direction to cooperate to 
promote an international economic system that leads to sustainable development lie among 
the principles enumerated in Article 3.51 
 Perhaps sustainable development should be considered as a complex policy 
objective, itself consisting of primary elements that should each be treated as independent 
principles.52  Four recurring elements of sustainable development reflected in international 
agreements: 1) the need to preserve natural resources for the benefit of future generations 
(intergenerational equity principle); 2) the aim of exploiting natural resources in a manner 
that is ”sustainable,” ”prudent,” ”rational,” ”wise,” or ”appropriate” (sustainable use 
principle); 3) the ”equitable” use of natural resources, which implies that use by one state 
must take into account the needs of other states (equitable use or intragenerational equity 
principle); and 4) the need to ensure that environmental considerations are integrated into 
economic and other development plans, programs, and projects, and that development 
needs are taken into account in applying environmental objectives (integration principle).53  
Intergenerational and intragenerational equity are captured explicitly among the UNFCCC 
principles by reference to protection of the climate system ”for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind.”54  Indeed, ”[s]ecuring broad-based and sustained 
                                               
51 The UNFCCC is among the first international environmental treaties to explicitly include a statement of 
“principles.”  Sands, supra note 15, at 253.  Since the chapeau of Article 3 directs the parties to be guided 
“inter alia” by the enumerated principles, the list of principles is not exclusive of others not specified.  Daniel 
Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale J. Int’l 
L. 451, 502 (1993). 
52 Massimilano Montini, Sustainable Development with the Climate Change Regime, in SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 523 (Hans Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt eds., 
Europa Law Publishing 2008). 
53 Sands, supra note 15, at 253.   
54 UNFCCC art. 3(1). 
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participation in international co-operation to tackle climate change depends upon finding an 
approach widely understod as equitable.”55 
 Legal principles with roots in equity are important to the substantive legitimacy of 
Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms in other respects as well.  As noted by the third paragraph 
of the UNFCCC preamble, developed countries are responsible for the largest share of 
historical and current greenhouse gas emissions.  Neither the contributions of individual 
countries to global warming nor the impacts are uniformly distributed.  (The same is 
manifestly true of individuals’ contributions and the impacts upon them.56)  Consequently, 
the UNFCCC incorporates a strong version of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, which, though not unprecedented, is also its first unambiguous adoption in 
an international law instrument.57  As implied by the Rio Declaration, the common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle is rooted in recognition of states’ differing needs, 
pressures placed on the environment, and capabilities in terms of wealth and technology.58  
The practical consequences of the principle are that all states are entitled (or required) to 
particpate in international efforts to address environmental problems and that obligations 
on states may be differentiated.59 
 In light of their historical and current role in creation of the crisis, as well as their 
greater resources, developed countries are to take the lead in combating climate change. 
Not only UNFCCC Article 3 explicit principles reflect this: Article 4 mandates that 
developed countries demonstrate their leadership in modifying longer-term trends in 
                                               
55 Stern Review at 535. 
56 More than 98 per cent of people affected by climate disasters live in developing countries.  United Nations 
Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007 – 08 77, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf. 
57 Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 
276, 279 (2004). 
58 Id. at 290 – 91; Rio Declaration principles 6 and 7. 
59 Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, The Principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsbilities: Origins and Scope, August 2002 http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/brief_common.pdf. 
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emissions through the policies and measures they adopt.60  This has also been called the 
”leadership principle.”61   
 Basic calculations based on IPCC information and the notion of simple per capita 
emissions equity lead to the conclusion that emissions reductions in the UK and USA, for 
example, must near 99% by 2050.62  A more thorough and well-reasoned analysis, called 
the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework, looks at the common but differentiated 
responsibilities principle in the context of national responsibility and capacity.63  It starts 
with the premises that climate change must be mitigated and that developing countries must 
continue economic development at least to attain a ”development threshold,” where people 
have realized their right to development.  The Framework credibly concludes that the 
national mitigation obligations of the developed countries vastly exceed the emission 
reductions that they could make domestically.  Accordingly, wealthier and higher-emitting 
countries should be given ”negative allocations” of greenhouse gas emissions under the 
international regime, requiring them not only to undertake aggressive domestic action for 
emissions reductions but also to finance further reductions abroad.64 
 Closely related to the equity-based leadership principle is the polluter pays 
principle, which 
mainly deals with the distribution of costs between the 
polluter and the victim of pollution.  It establishes the main 
rule that the polluter – and not the victim – is responsible for 
the costs of prevention, restitution and damage.  The 
development of this principle, from its old roots, indicates 
                                               
60 UNFCCC Art. 3(1) and 4(2)(a). 
61 David M. Driesen, FreeLlunch or Cheap Fix?: TheEmission Trading Idea and the Climate Change 
Convention, 26 B.C. Envt’l Aff. L. R. 1 (1998). 
62 George Monbiot, This crisis demands a reappraisal of who we are and what progress means, The 
Guardian, Dec. 4, 2007. 
63 PAUL BAER, TOM ATHANASIOU, SIVAN KARTHA, AND ERIC KEMP-BENEDICT, THE GREENHOUSE 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A CLIMATE CONSTRAINED WORLD, 
(Rev. Second. Ed., Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2008). 
64 Id. at 67 - 71. 
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that this has been perceived as a ’natural’ legal solution, 
based on consideration of fairness or ’justice.’ 65 
 For present purposes, the polluter pays principle must be seen on two levels.  The 
first, more closely related to the leadership principle, is on the state-to-state level.  It 
concerns questions about relative state efforts, commitments, and distribution of costs.  The 
second level concerns operators of greenhouse gas emitting facilities and others, both 
private and public sector, whose activities affect greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere by impacting cabon absorption or otherwise.  While the international 
agreements tend not to explicitly address issues of cost and equity on this second level, it is 
here where things happen on the ground, where things change – or do not – and where 
efforts are seen to take place, as is often true in the use of the flexibility mechanisms. 
 The polluter pays principle can be a highly visible and important aspect of 
substantive legitimacy.  The principle can have powerful pedagogical and norm-creating 
effects.   
If the public sees that the government acts to ensure members 
of society, even large corporations, bear responsibility for the 
costs they impose on others, then the public will more likely 
trust their government.  Individuals will also be more likely 
to accept personal responsibility for themselves.  The 
opposite may be true if individuals understand (even if 
incorrectly) that large corporations can ’buy’ their way out of 
pollution abatements obligations.66 
 Human rights, as jus cogens, must also be respected by any particular institution of 
international law for it to be considered substantively legitimate.  Protection of the 
environment is central to protection of human rights, implicated by rights to health and to 
                                               
65  Bugge, supra note 15, at 65. See also, Sands, supra note 15, at 279 and 285 (offering similar definition but 
noting that “the extent of the principle is up for debate – whether it includes costs for decontamination, clean 
up and reinstatement – it certainly includes costs of measures required by public authorities to prevent and 
control pollution.”)  See also, Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution 
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 Harv. Envt’l L. R. 465, 466 (2000).  Although the polluter 
pays principle originated in the field of environmental economics, it can be considered to be a principle of 
equity, as well as one of ethics.  Bugge, supra note 15, at 55 – 56, 66.   
66 Nash, supra note 65, at 479.  
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life itself, as well as subsidiary rights such as those to water, food, and family life.  The 
linkages between human rights and environmental protection are now widely recognized.67  
It is not hard to see how global warming may affect ”[v]irtually the whole gamut of human 
rights protected under international law,” including also the right to a livelihood, the right 
not to be displaced, and the right to culture, as well, of course, the right to a healthy 
environment.68  The human rights aspects of global warming have garnered more attention 
as it becomes clear that the poor are disproportionately and more imminently harmed by 
global warming.69  ”Generally, poor countries, and poor people in any given country, suffer 
the most ....”70  It has been argued that ”the human rights consequences of global warming 
are potentially so severe that they will overwhelmingly prevail over economic and related 
                                               
67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 7b, 10-3, and 12, Dec. 16, 1966; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989; ILO Convention No. 169 concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries arts. 2, 6. 7, 15, 25, Jun. 27, 1989; African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 16 and 24, Jun. 26, 1991; Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988; 
Aarhus Convention preable; Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes, Jun. 17, 1999; Lopez-Ostra v. Spain, ECHR 
(1994), Series A, No. 303-A; Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Health & Environmental Protection: Linkages in 
Law and Practice: A Background Paper for the World Health Organization, Health and Human Rights 
Working Paper Series No 1 (2002)  
http://www.who.int/hhr/information/en/Series_1%20%20Human_Rights_Health_Environmental%20Protecti
on_Shelton.pdf  
68 Sumudu Atapattu, Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive this 
Onslaught?, 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 35, 45 – 60 (2008). 
68 Philippe Cullet, The Global Warming Regime after 2012: Towards a New Focus, Economic & Political 
Weekly, Jul. 12, 2008, 109, 110. 
69 Id.; see also, Julian Borger, Climate change disaster is upon us, warns UN, The Guardian, Oct. 5, 2007 
(UN emergency relief coordinator attributes to climate change 12 of 13 2007 disasters resulting in emergency 
UN appeals). 
70 Stern Review at 31.  “Developing countries will be particularly badly hit, for three reasons: their 
geography; their stronger dependence on agriculture; and because with their fewer resources comes greater 
vulnerability.”  Id at 33; see also, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, American Indians, Climate Change, and Ethics for a 
Warming World, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 865 (2008). 
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considerations if human rights are effectively taken into consideration in global warming 
law and policy.”71 
 The UNFCCC does not call air or atmosphere the ”common heritage” of mankind, 
as are space and the deep sea floor; instead it acknowledges a ”common concern.”72  This 
recognizes that climatic issues can only be addressed through international cooperation and 
limitations on sovereignty, but leaves unsettled the extent to which states can lay claims on 
pieces or aspects of the climate.73  This situation is unresolved by Kyoto, which 
nonetheless effectively provides developed countries with entitlements to pollute.74  The 
linkage to the fundamental human rights implications of global warming would be more 
direct under Kyoto if the ”common heritage” status was acknowledged.75  However, the 
fact is immutable – all humans have an interest in the atmosphere as its health is necessary 
for the human rights of all, though more immediately for some than others. 
 Efficiency, meaning production of the desired result while minimizing resource 
expenditures, is also important for legitimacy.76  Governments and institutions that are 
perceived to be wasteful in progressing towards their objective are disdained and 
disrespected.  The UNFCCC includes efficiency among its principles in its reference to 
”cost-effective .....”77   
 Tension between the concept of efficiency, especially when characterized as cost-
effectiveness, and the other elements of substantive legitimacy may exist.  Given the 
weight of the other elements in the context of the existential problem of global warming, 
efficiency can not subjugate these other elements.78  This is especially so when the 
potential costs of global warming, i.e., the costs of doing nothing or too little for mitigation, 
                                               
71 Cullet, supra note 68, at 114. 
72 UNFCCC preamble. 
73 Cullet, supra note 68 at 115; PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 128 – 130 (Oxford Univ. Press 3rd rev. ed., 2009) 
74 Cullet, supra note 68, at 115. 
75 Id.  at 114 – 115. 
76 Delbruck, supra note 12, at 42. 
77 UNFCCC art. 3(3). 
78 Voigt, supra note 49.  
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are included in a cost equation.  In any event, expensive is not the same as inefficient.  
Only if substantive legitimacy is achieved at high cost due to waste and unwise spending 
can these elements conflict. 
3 Flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
3.1 Role of the flexibility mechanisms in general 
 Under Kyoto Protocol Article 3, the treaty’s Annex B establishes commitments for 
reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions minus removals, or sinks) in terms 
of percent reductions from a 1990 baseline to be achieved by 2012, the end of the five year-
long first commitment period.  Only developed countries, identified in Annex 1, have 
Annex B commitments.  Developing countries have no specific reduction commitments.  
Collectively, satisfaction of these targets would signify a 5% reduction in annual average 
emissions below 1990 levels for Annex 1 countries.79  This target is defined as a weighted 
average of the six greenhouse gases directly addressed by Kyoto: cabon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, HFCs, PFCs, and sulfur hexaflouride. 
 Due to the selection of the 1990 reference year, and perhaps for political reasons, 
the former communist countries, which saw substantially reduced industrial output after the 
fall of their governments around 1990, have commitments that far exceed their actual 
expected levels of emissions.  This difference between the commitment levels and the 
actual emissions of these former communist countries, which is greatest for the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, is called ”hot air.” 
 In its Articles 6, 12, and 17, the Kyoto Protocol established the three inter-related 
flexibility mechanisms – Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism, and 
International Emissions Trading, respectively – as key instruments for the control of 
greenhouse gas emissions, or, more precisely, to facilitate ”cost-effective” satisfaction of 
Annex B commitments.  Under the flexibility mechanism provisions, Annex 1 parties can 
achieve some portion of the required emission reductions beyond their own borders 
through the use of various economic instruments.  The flexibility mechanisms therefor tend 
to make the Annex B allocations representative of the overall level of responsibility that the 
                                               
79 T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 15 (2nd ed., Resources for the Future 
2006). 
 20 
developed countries undertake, rather than of the emissions reductions that are required to 
physically occur within their borders.80  All three can be considered varieties of emissions 
trading mechanisms. 
Emissions trading mechanisms have numerous dimensions 
and there are many varieties of such systems.  A basic 
distinction lies between ’cap and trade’ and ’baseline and 
credit’ approaches.  Under the former, a fixed number of 
permits are created and each allows the emission of a 
stipulated amount of pollutant.  These permits are allocated 
or auctioned to firms [or nations] that are then free to trade 
them on the open market.  In a baseline and credit regime, 
companies [or nations] are given performance targets or 
’baselines’ – often set with reference to business as usual 
(BAU) projections – and they can generate credits by beating 
their emissions targets.  Such credits may then be traded on 
the open market.  With cap and trade, there is a fixed supply 
of permits for trading, whereas in baseline and credit the 
supply of credits for trading depends on the regulatees’ 
performance in generating credits by reducing emissions 
below baselines.81 
3.2 Three flexibility mechanisms 
3.2.1 International emissions trading 
 The Article 17 mechanism, International Emissions Trading, is a cap and trade 
system.  Through Annex B, Kyoto essentially created permits to limit emissions for the 
Annex 1 countries.  The majority of states, including such important emitters as China and 
India, are developing countries that have no emissions caps and are excluded from both 
Annex B and IET.  Annex 1 countries can buy and sell to each other their emissions 
allocations under this scheme, either to comply with their emissions reductions 
commitments or to reap financial reward for having emissions below their commitment 
levels. 
 Annex 1 states (or any group of collaborating states) may establish internal 
emissions trading schemes in which the state’s allowable emissions, or a portion thereof, 
                                               
80 Stern Review at 534. 
81 Robert Baldwin, Regulation lite: The rise of emissions trading, 2 Regulation & Governance 193, 194 
(2008). 
 21 
are allocated to individual domestic polluters.  The European Union Emissions Trading 
System (”EU ETS”) is the most prominent example of this.  As is the EU ETS, domestic 
regimes may be linked to the international Kyoto system to facilitate trades by individual 
domestic actors (including conglomerates and speculators) directly with foreign actors to 
meet emissions limitations in the domestic system, as well as states’ corresponding Annex 
B commitments. 
3.2.2 Clean development mechanism 
 The Article 12 Clean Development Mechanism, in contrast to IET, is a baseline and 
credit scheme.  Wtih CDM, Annex 1 countries can get credits towards meeting their Annex 
B commitments by funding projects that reduce anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases, or that enhance anthropogeneic removal by sinks, in developing (non-Annex 1) 
countries. 
 Article 12 specifies that CDM is also to help developing countries achieve 
sustainable development.  In practice, and in deference to the principle of sovereignty, 
satisfaction of this purpose is left to determination of the host country, through its voluntary 
participation in CDM and right to approve or reject any particular CDM project. 
3.2.3 Joint implementation 
 Joint Implementation, created by Kyoto Protocol Article 6, allows an Annex 1 
country, or private entitities ”under its responsibility,” to fund emissions reduction or sink 
enhancement projects in anAnnex 1 country and thus obtain credits towards compliance 
with Annex B commitments.82  Article 3(10) and (11) require the addition of carbon credits 
to the account of the purchasing country and subtraction from the account of the host 
country.  
3.3 Basis for the flexibility mechanisms 
 The three flexibility mechanisms are an attempt to fulfill the UNFCCC’s call for 
”cost-effective” policies and measures ”to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible 
cost.”83  Forms of emissions trading, the concepts behind them evolved from the 1960 work 
                                               
82 Kyoto Protocol art. 6(3). 
83 UNFCCC art. 3(3). 
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of economist Ronald Coase proposing a revolutionary approach to regulation focused on 
property rights.84 
 Emissions trading mechanisms minimize the financial burden of reaching a 
specified level of pollution reduction.85  Countries or firms with lower emissions abatement 
costs have an incentive to reduce emissions below the levels strictly required of them so 
they can sell emissions permits to polluters with higher abatement costs.86  The ”marginal 
abatement cost,” that is the cost of emissions reduction, will usually be greater in energy 
efficient industrialized countries than in developing countries or less fuel-efficient former 
communist countries.  In addition, regulators are, in theory, relieved of costly and 
contentious information-processing and decision-making tasks as choices are placed in the 
hands of managers and engineers.87  Thus, these market mechanisms result in the most 
cost-effective (i.e., lowest cost) achievement of overall emissions reduction targets.88  As 
Richard Sandor, considered to be the father of emissions trading, puts it, ”[t]he goal of 
market-based regulation is to reduce the cost of achieving a given pollution-reduction 
target or, equivalently, to realize larger pollution reductions at the same cost.”89 
 Another closely related objective of these mechanisms is spatial flexibility.  
Polluters at all levels who have the option to engage in an emissions trading scheme are 
free to chose how and where to achieve compliance with regulatory requirements or 
international commitments. 
                                               
84 TIETENBERG, supra note 79. 
85  Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1,333, 1,341 
– 1,342  (1985). 
86 TIETENBERG, supra note 79, at 27. 
87 Ackerman, supra note 85, at 1,342 – 43; BERND HANSJURGENS, EMISSIONS TRADING FOR CLIMATE POLICY: 
US AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
88 Stern Review at 371, 376. 
89 Richard L. Sandor, et al., An Overview of a free-market approach to climate change and conservation, in 
CAPTURING CARBON AND CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY, THE MARKET APPROACH 57 (ed. by Ian R. Swingland, 
Earthscan Publications, Ltd. 2002) at 57.   
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 This type of mechanism is also said to result in predictability of outcome.90  Cap 
and trade regimes in particular establish pollution ceilings.  Traditional command and 
control mechanisms or taxation mechanisms, in contrast, lack such predictable outcomes.  
In addition to the virtue inherent in allowing selection of a predictable outcome at a chosen 
target, it is argued that this capability limits ”arcane technical discussions” associated with 
traditional command and control regulation in favor of discussions about what outcomes to 
chose, thus enhancing democracy.91 
 Proponents of emissions trading schemes also claim that they stimulate 
innovation.92  Among other things, they rely on a study of a United States emissions trading 
program showing that the program ”did not necessarily lead to more innovation, as 
measured by patent counts, but did lead to more environmentally friendly inovation,” as 
measured by the effect of innovations on efficiency of new pollution control equipment.93  
They argue that firms have the incentive to find novel and cheaper ways to cut emissions so 
that allowances can be generated and sold. 
 Proponents of the flexibility mechanisms point to political advantages.  Inclusion of 
the flexibility mechanisms in Kyoto was seen as a way to offer something to developing 
countries (via CDM investment).94  They were also a way to avoid major opposition from 
entrenched powers, both state and industrial.95  Entrenched powers can use their 
accumulated wealth to dampen the pain of emission reduction regulation through these 
mechanisms.   
                                               
90 Robert N. Stavins, Implications of the US experience with market-based environmental strategies for future 
climate policy, in EMISSIONS TRADING FOR CLIMATE POLICY: US AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 63, 64 
(Bernd Hansjurgens ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
91 Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum. J. 
Envtl L. 171, 189 (1987). 
92 HANSJURGENS, supra note 87, at 4 
93 TIETENBERG, supra note 79, at 69. 
94 Cullet, supra note 68, at 109, 111. 
95 Jan-Tjeerd Bloom & Andries Nentjes, Alternative design options for emissions trading: a survey and 
assessment of the literature, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 45, 57 (Michael Faure, et al, 
eds., Edward Elgar 2003). 
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 Relatedly, a major advantage of emissions trading schemes is the enabling of 
separate consideration of efficiency and equity:  equity first through allocation of emissions 
permits and then efficiency through trading mechanisms. 96 
 Finally, it is said that the flexibility mechanisms have helped create a partnership of 
many varied actors worldwide who now collaborate to finance emission-reducing projects 
and transfer low carbon technology to less developed or less efficient countries.97  CDM 
and JI provide incentives to potential host countries to create enabling environments for 
private sector investment (e.g., economic and political stability, liberalised markets, strong 
legal structures) and related national capacities.98  Thus, the flexibility mechanisms, despite 
their shortcomings, represent an important step towards a system of vigorous international 
cooperation for mitigation of the global climate crisis.99  Perhaps the development of 
international climate change law will be similar to that of international human rights law in 
growing from apparently weak beginnings to a more sturdy and substantial framework over 
time. 
3.4 Supplementarity 
 How Annex 1 countries meet their Annex B commitments is largely up to their 
discretion.  However, use of the flexibility mechanisms in attaining compliance is supposed 
to be only ”supplemental” to actual reductions in-country to force developed countries to 
undertake significant domestic action to reduce emissions.100  A firm definition of 
                                               
96 Stern Review at 536. 
97 Stern Review at 384, 570. 
98 Stern Review at 573. 
99 United States Government Accountability Office, Observations on the Potential Role of Carbon Offsets in 
Climate Change Legislation, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives (March 5, 2009) at 15. 
100 Luke Brander, The Kyoto Mechanisms and the economics of their design, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
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”supplemental” has eluded the international community.101  The only certainty about 
”supplementarity” is that an Annex 1 country can not entirely satisfy its Annex B 
commitments by acquiring credits through the flexibility mechanisms, but, as a practical 
matter, a showing of any domestic effort that is arguably ”significant” will be sufficient to 
demonstrate ”supplementarity” even if reliance on the flexibility mechanisms to meet 
commitments is the principle means.102 
3.5 Additionality 
 Importantly, to obtain CDM or JI credits, emissions reductions resulting from these 
projects must satisfy a test of ”additionality.”103  That is, but for the CDM or JI project and 
the income it provides, the emissions reduction or greenhouse gas removal would not have 
taken place.  In other words, it must be shown that the project results in lower emissions or 
greater removals than would have taken place in a business as usual scenario without CDM 
or JI.  If CDM or JI credits ”are created that represent emission reductions that would have 
happened anyway, then these ’paper reductions’ will undermine the integrity of the Kyoto 
Protocol.”104  Every carbon credit generated by a CDM or JI project allows the funding 
country with emission reduction commitments to emit one ton CO2e more than its 
reduction target, so any non-additional project that generates credits is likely to increase 
global emissions. 
 
                                               
101 UNFCCC, The Marrakesh Accords and the Marrakesh Declaration, Decision -/CP.7 (Mechanisms), 2001 
[hereinafter Marrakesh Accords] (“… the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action 
and … domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in 
Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments ….”)  
102 Id; FROUKJE MARIA PLATJOUW, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AT HOME OR ABROAD? A STUDY 
ON THE SUPPLEMENTARITY REQUIREMENT FOR THE FLEXIBILITY MECHANISMS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 30 
(Institutt for offenlig rett Universitetet i Oslo, 2008). 
103 Kyoto Protocol art. 6(1)(b) and 12(5)(c). 
104 Voigt, supra note 50, at 16; see also, Stern Review at 376; United States Government Accountability 
Office, Observations on the Potential Role of Carbon Offsets in Climate Change Legislation, Testimony 
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Representatives (Mar. 5, 2009) at 13. 
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3.6 Details of joint implementation 
3.6.1 JI actors 
 JI projects are emissions reduction or greenhouse gas removal enhancement 
activities undertaken in and funded by Annex 1 countries to help meet the funding 
countries’ Annex B reduction commitments.  JI is most used and encouraged in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with their high levels of energy inefficiency in 
industrialized economies. 105  Annex 1 parties may authorize corporations or other legal 
entities to participate in JI projects provided that the participation is under the party’s 
responsibility.106  Credits for JI projects, called ”Emissions Reductions Units,”107 are 
available for projects that started as early as 2000, but only for the five-year Kyoto 
crediting period 2008 – 2012.108 
 The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC/Meeting of the Parties to Kyoto 
(COP/MOP) provides guidance regarding the implementation of JI and exercises authority 
over the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, which it established in 2005.109  
The JI Supervisory Committee oversees verification of Emission Reduction Units 
generated by JI project activities, although only in certain cases (Track 1, explained below).  
It is also responsible for the accreditation of independent entities (and has an Accreditation 
Panel for this purpose) and the review of related standards and procedures.110  The 
Committee’s procedures concering independent entity accreditation provide for various 
                                               
105 Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its 
first session, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005, Decisions adopted by the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 30 March 2006, Decision 9/CMP.1 
[hereinafter Montreal COP Report]. 
106 Kyoto Protocol art. 6(3). 
107 “Emissions Reduction Units,” “Certified Emissions Reductions,” and ”Assigned Amount Units,” the terms 
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108 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1. 
109 Id. Decision 10/CMP.1, para 1 (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2). 
110 Id. Decision 9/CMP.1; Decision 10/CMP.1, para 2(c) (FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2).       
 27 
types of capacity and function reviews, including spot checks, withdrawals of accreditation, 
and appeals to the Committee by independent entities of Accreditation Panel 
recomendations concerning their qualifications and procedural compliance.111 
 There are ten members on the JI Supervisory Committee, elected by the COP/MOP, 
with fixed-period terms and limitations allowing a total of ten consecutive years of 
service.112  Rules on conflict of interest provide that members shall have no pecuniary 
interest in any JI project, nor in any accredited independent entity.113   
 Designated operating entities under the CDM program have been temporarily 
authorized to act as Accredited Independent Entities (”AIEs”) for JI.114  There are 26 
designated operating entities.  The JI Supervisory Committee has now accredited about 15 
companies to do validation, verification, and monitoring work, but only 2 to have full 
authority to clear carbon credits under Track 2 (explained below).115  These companies are 
also often the same ones that consult on JI projects and that prepare PDDs. 
3.6.2 JI rules 
 The seventh Conference of the Parties (COP-7) produced the Marrakech Accords in 
2001 to establish procedures for the three flexibility mechanisms.  The provisions for JI 
were finalized and made effective at the 2005 COP/MOP in Montreal. 
 JI projects can be either emissions reductions projects or sink projects.  Emissions 
reductions projects reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, while sink projects, also known 
                                               
111 Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, Procedure for Accrediting Independent Entities by the Joint 
Implementation Supervisory Committee (Version 04, effective Nov. 29, 2008), 
http://ji.unfccc.int/Ref/Documents/Procedure_Accrediting_IE.pdf. 
112 Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, Rules of Procedure of the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee, Rules 4 and 5, http://ji.unfccc.int/Ref/Documents/Rules.pdf.  Though they serve in 
their individual capacities, three members are to be from Annex 1 countries with economies in transition, 
three from Annex 1 countries (non-economies in transition), three from non-Annex 1 countries, and one from 
a small, developing island state.  Id., Rules 3 and 4. 
113 Id., Rule 9.  Violation of the rules on conflict of interest are grounds for termination or suspension.  Id., 
Rule 7. 
114 Montreal COP Report, Decision 10/CMP.1, para. 3. 
115 John McGarrity, JI panel approves SGS as auditor, Point Carbon News, April 22, 2009. 
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as Land Use and Land Use Change or Forestry projects (”LULUCF”), enhance 
anthropogenic removal.  The rules exclude nuclear facilities from eligibility for JI.116 
 The rules establish two tracks for verification of JI projects.  Countries satisfying 
minimal requirements – being a party to Kyoto, having a calculated and recorded emissions 
reduction commitment, and having a national registry of emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks in compliance with Kyoto Article 7(4) – are eligible to participate in 
Track 2, in which an AIE verifies that the project is valid and compliant with the rules.117  
Host countries satisfying these rules and additional ones – having a national system for 
estimation of emissions by sources and removal by sinks in compliance with Kyoto Article 
5(1), submitting of the most recent annual inventory in compliance with Articles 5(2) and 
7(1), and completing annual inventorying in compliance with Article 7(1) – are eligible to 
use Track 1.118  Track 1 is also known as ”fast track JI” because ”standards are more 
flexible, external third-party determination is not a requirement, and procedures for 
baselines and monitoring are set by the national guidelines of the host country, taking into 
account criteria for baseline setting and monitoring” in the rules.119 
 The information describing the proposed JI project, including all information 
necessary to determine whether the project has the involved Parties’ approval, satisfies the 
requirement of additionality, and has an appropriate baseline and monitoring plan, is to be 
included in a project development document (”PDD”).120 
 Project approvals are deemed final 45 days after the date on which the 
determination is made public, unless one of the countries involved in the project or three JI 
Supervisory Committee members request a Committee review.121  The Committee is to 
                                               
116 Marrakesh Accords, Decision -/CP.7 (Article 6). 
117 Montreal COP Report at 6 – 7. 
118 Montreal COP Report at 6 – 7. 
119 Dane Ratliff, Joint Implementation: tracking recent developments, 2 Environmental Liability 56, 58 
(2007); Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Annex at para. 23 - 24.   
120 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Annex at para. 31; PDD template at 
http://ji.unfccc.int/Ref/Forms.html. 
121 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Annex at para. 35. 
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give reasons for its determination upon review, and this determination is final and 
unreviewable.   
 Similarly, a determination regarding final verification, the last step before carbon 
credits are awarded, is deemed final fifteen days after the date on which it is made public, 
unless one of the involved countries or three members of the JI Supervisory Committee 
request a review.122  The Committee has thirty days to decide whether to perform a review, 
and then, if a review is to be done, thirty days more to complete it.123  The Committee is to 
explain the outcome of its review and make it public.124 
 In addition to calculating or estimating the project’s impact on greenhouse gas 
emissions or removals (as described below), the project proponent or host country is also to 
perform an ”analysis of the environmental impacts of the project activity, including 
transboundary impacts, in accordance with procedures as determined by the host Party.”  If 
those impacts are considered ”significant” by the project participants or host country, an 
environmental impact assessment must be produced ”in accordance with procedures as 
required by the host Party,” and the results included in the PDD.125  The rules are silent on 
a situation where the host country has no laws on environmental impact assessment as, in 
respect of the principle of state sovereignty, precise requirements regarding EIA are left to 
host state discretion.   
 These procedures are the ones established for all JI projects.  The specific 
agreements between the JI parties are set in contracts between them. 
 Kyoto Protocol Article 6 makes no mention of public participation but, under the 
rules, the process includes an opportunity for comments from ”stakeholders,” defined as 
”the public, including individuals, groups or communities affected, or likely to be affected, 
by the project,” after publication of the PDD.126  This thirty-day comment period is early in 
the process, before initial project approval (”determination”), but after project design.  
                                               
122 Id., Decision 9/CMP.1 Annex at para. 39. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id., Decision 9/CMP.1 Annex para. 33; PDD template, supra note 120, at section F.1. 
126 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Annex at para. 1) and 8 (Annex at 32). 
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Since all JI projects must be approved by both the host country and the funding country, 
participating countries’ domestic laws establish more rigorous public participation 
standards.127 
 The rules include criteria for baseline setting and monitoring, on which the JI 
Supervisory Committee has provided guidance.128  The baseline, crucial for determining 
additionality and to verify carbon credits, ”is the scenario that reasonably represents the 
anthropogenic emissions by sources or anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed project.”129  It must include all 
categories of emissions covered by Annex B and all anthropogenic removals by sinks 
within the project boundary.130 
 For an emissions reduction project, the project boundary ”shall” encompass all 
anthropogenic emissions under the control of the project participants, reasonably 
attributable to the project, and ”significant,” while defined on a case-by-case basis ”with 
regard to these criteria.”131   
 Baselines may be established on a project-specific basis and/or using a multi-project 
emission factor.132  The rules include specifications for ”sector-wide baselines,” but imply 
that other ”multi-project emission factors” may be acceptable.133  Sector-wide baselines 
may be used if ”[t]he physical characteristics of the sector justify the application of a 
standard emission factor across the sector,” and/or ”[t]he emissions intensity does not vary 
                                               
127 Kyoto Protocol art. 6(1)(a). 
128 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Appendix B; Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, 
Guidance on Criteria for Baseline Setting and Monitoring Ver. 01, (“JISC Baseline/Monitoring Guidance”), 
http://ji.unfccc.int/Ref/Documents/Baseline_setting_and_monitoring.pdf. 
129 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Appendix B. 
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131 JISC Baseline/Monitoring Guidance at 3.  The further guidance on “significant” is “i.e., as a rule of thumb, 
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132 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Appendix B; JISC Baseline/Monitoring Guidance at 5. 
133 JISC Baseline/Monitoring Guidance at 5. 
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significantly across the sector.”134  Use of sector-wide baselines is attractive to make both 
common types of projects and those with diffuse efficiency gains more feasible.  The most 
discussed types of sector-wide baselines are those for district heating systems in Eastern 
Europe, electricity, and diffuse energy efficiency projects.135   
 For project-specific baselines, use of methodologies approved by the CDM 
Executive Board is available, but the only requirement is the satisfaction of the criteria set 
in the Montreal COP report.136  The additional substance of these criteria are transparency 
”with regard to the choice of approaches, assumptions, methodologies, parameters, data 
sources and key factors”; ”taking into account relevant national and/or sectoral policies and 
circumstances, such as sectoral reform initiatives, local fuel availability, power sector 
expansion plans, and the economic situation in the project sector”; ”taking account of 
uncertainties and using conservative assumptions”; and prevention of carbon crediting for 
”decreases in activity levels outside the project activity or due to force majeur.”137  The JI 
Supervisory Committee provides additional guidance only as to ”key factors.”138 
Key factors that affect a baseline shall be taken into account, 
e.g.: 
(a) Sectoral reform policies and legislation; 
(b) Economic situation/growth and socio-demographic 
factors in the relevant sector as well as resulting predicted 
demand.  Suppressed an/or increasing demand that will be 
met by the project can be considered in the baseline as 
appropriate (e.g. by assuming that the same level of service 
as in the project scenario would be offered in the baseline 
scenario); 
(c) Availability of capital (including investment barriers); 
                                               
134 Id. 
135 E.g., Possibilities for Standardized Baselines for JI and the CDM: Chairman’s Recommendations and 
Workshop Report,  UNEP/OECD/IEA Workshop on Baseline Methodologies, July 2001 
http://uneprisoe.org/baselineworkshop/WsReport.pdf 
136 Id. 
137 Montreal COP Report, Decision 9/CMP.1 Appendix B. 
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 32 
(d) Local availability of technologies, skills and know-how 
and availability of best available technologies in the future;  
(e) Fuel prices and availability; 
(f) National and/or subnational expansion plans for the 
energy sector, as appropriate; 
(g) National and/or subnational forestry or agricultural 
policies, as appropriate.139 
 To demonstrate the additionality of the JI project a methodology approved by the 
CDM Executive Board may be used, the latest additionality tool approved by the CDM 
Executive Board may be used140, or ”traceable and transparent information” showing the 
validity of the baseline, that the project is not part of the baseline, and that the project ”will 
lead” to emissions reductions or removals may be provided.141  Alternatively, additionality 
may be shown by provision of ”traceable and transparent information that an accredited 
independent entity has already positively determined that a comparable project (to be) 
implemented under comparable circumstances (same [greenhouse gas] mitigation measure, 
same country, similar technology, similar scale)” would result in emissions reduction or 
removals, and ”a justification why this determination is relevant for the project at hand.”142 
 ”Leakage,” defined as ”the net change of anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and/or removals by sinks of [greenhouse gases] which occurs outside the project boundary, 
and that can be measured and is directly attributable to the JI project,” is to be assessed and 
”calculated,” presumably for consideration along with the baseline, or ”neglected.”143  No 
rules or guidance for when leakage can be neglected are provided.144 
 The rules require a monitoring plan that satisfies certain criteria: collection and 
archiving of all relevant data necessary for estimating or measuring emissions and/or 
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140 CDM Executive Board, Methodological Tool ”Tool for the demonstration and assessment of 
additionality,” EB 39 Report Annex 10, http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-
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removals, as well as baseline; leakage; collection and archiving of information on 
environmental impacts, ”in accordance with procedures as required by the host Party”; 
quality assurance and control procedures; and documentation of all steps involved in these 
calculations.145  Methodologies approved by the CDM Executive Board are optional.146  
The JI Supervisory Committee provides guidance on monitoring plan contents and 
format.147  ”The indicators, constants, variables and/or models used shall be reliable (i.e. 
provide consistent and accurate values) and valid (i.e. be clearly connected with the effect 
to be measured), and shall provide a transparent picture of the emission reductions or 
enhancements of net removals (to be) monitored.”148  However, ”[d]efault values, may be 
used, as appropriate [sic].  In the selection of default values, accuracy and reasonableness 
shall be carefully balanced.  The default values chosen should originate from recognized 
sources, be supported by statistical analyses providing reasonable confidence levels and be 
presented in a transparent manner.”149  Revisions to the monitoring plan are subject to 
approval.150  Implementation of the monitoring plan is required for JI project 
verification.151 
 Once a JI project is approved, it is monitored, and then resulting emissions 
reductions or enhancements of net removals are calculated or estimated.152  ”Reductions of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancements of net anthropogenic removals by 
sinks of greenhouse gases generated by [JI] projects are estimated/calculated by comparing 
the quantified anthropogenic emissions by sources or net anthropogenic removals by sinks 
within the project boundary in the baseline scenario with those in the project scenario and 
adjusting for leakage.”153  Two ways to conduct the pre-adjustment for leakage 
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”estimation/calculation” are allowed: ”[a]ssessment of emissions or net removals in the 
baseline scenario and in the project scenario” (”estimating/calculating” both the emissions 
or removals within the project boundary and those in the baseline scenario and taking the 
difference), or ”[d]irect assessment of emission reductions” (”direct estimation/calculation 
of the difference between the anthropogenic emissions by sources within the project 
boundary in the baseline scenario and in the project scenario”).154 
 The final step, if monitoring and ”estimation/calculation” confirms emissions 
reductions or removals, is verification by either the host country (Track 1) or the AIE 
(Track 2), and then entry of the carbon credits in the UNFCCC registry. 
3.7 Joint implementation in practice 
3.7.1 JI to date 
 Approximately 188 project development documents (”PDDs”) for JI projects were 
submitted to UNFCCC for proposed projects.  JI is off to a slower start than CDM, which 
has more than 4,200 projects in the pipeline and about 1,700 registered projects, because JI 
did not benefit from the ”prompt start” provisions as did CDM and because the countries 
with the greatest JI potential – Russia and Ukraine – were slow to develop their approval 
frameworks.155  The majority of the listed JI projects are now hosted by Russia 
(approximately 53%) and Ukraine (approximately 18%), though Russia did not have 
finalized rules about JI approval until January 2008.156  Other host countries include 
Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia, Czech 
Republic, and Romania.  Presumably recognizing inability to domestically meet Annex B 
commitments, the most active JI carbon credit buyers have been EU governments and 
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Japan, though the participation of the private sector is increasing.  An average of four 
PDDs a month were submitted in 2008.157 
 According to the classifications provided by the UNFCCC website, of the PDDs 
listed, about 46% are in energy industries, 24% in fugitive fuel emissions, 14% in 
manufacturing, 11% in waste handling and disposal, 7% in mining or mineral production, 
6% in energy demand, 5% in energy distribution, and a few projects in fugitive emissions 
from production and consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexaflouride, metal 
production, and transport.  The total is more than 100% because some projects fall in 
multiple categories. 
 According to the UNFCCC website, public comments were received on only 
approximately 27 (approximately 16%) of 174 proposed PDDs with closed comment 
periods (as of June 2009).  Of these, no proposed project is shown to have received more 
than two comments, and a substantial portion of these comments were submitted by 
government agencies.  Projects may receive comments in domestic law-required public 
participation processes before the PDD comment period, however. 
 Recent research into JI in Ukraine, for example, found that coal mine methane 
(”CMM”), industrial energy saving and energy efficiency projects made up more than 90% 
of the country’s JI projects, and that ”the major contribution of JI in Ukraine relates to 
capacity building, and the readiness of the country to participate in international climate 
policies in the future, rather than the financial and social benefits of JI.”158 
 Trade in JI-generated carbon credits increased dramatically from 2006 (21 MT 
CO2e worth 95 million Euro) to 2007 (38 MT CO2e worth 326 million Euro) and to 2008 
(approximately 71 MT CO2e), before dropping in 2009 with the worldwide recession 
(estimated 40 MT CO2e).159  This trade represents a very small portion (about one percent) 
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of the total world carbon market.160  Before the financial crisis, Point Carbon reported 
estimates of 210 million JI carbon credits available by the end of 2012 compared to over 
1.5 billion from CDM.161  JI may become more important in the future, however, if more 
countries come under binding emissions reduction commitments and thus under JI rather 
than CDM.162 
3.7.2 Zasyadco coal mine methane project 
 As of June 2009, only one Track 2 JI project, ”Utilization of Coal Mine Methane at 
the Coal Mine named after A.F. Zasyadco,” had received final verification, to the amount 
of approximately 651,000 tons CO2 equivalent.  With a few details, this project can serve 
an illustrative example for further discussion. 
 The Zasyadko project uses methane recovered from a large complex of four 
underground coal mines in Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, for production of electricity, heat, 
and vehicle fuel, primarily for mine operations.163  The Zasyadko mine complex is one of 
the most productive in Ukraine, at approximately three billion tons/year.164  Due to the 
hazard of underground methane explosion, Ukrainian law requires that coal mine methane 
(”CMM”) be vented from mines, but not productively used.165  The Zasyadko mine has a 
troublesome history of methane explosions, with seven serious accidents since 1999 taking 
the lives of a total of 296 workers, including the worst disaster in Ukrainian mining history, 
costing 101 miners’ lives in 2007.166 
 The purchasers of the carbon credits generated by – and thus the funders of – the 
Zasyadko project are the Marubeni Corporation of Japan and VEMA S.A. of 
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Switzerland.167  Marubeni is a large, multinational corporation, with product and service 
businesses in a broad range of sectors, including  pulp and paper, chemicals, energy, metals 
and mineral resources, and iron and steel products.  It is a major purchaser of carbon 
credits.168  VEMA produces machinery of various types. 
4 Problems with JI 
 Many say that the inclusion of the flexibility mechanisms made agreement on 
Kyoto possible, which was at least important to build momentum for broadly-coordinated 
international action on climate change.169  Undoubtedly, JI and CDM have build national 
and international capacities and fostered personal and institutional connections that will be 
important for future mitigation efforts, and they have contributed to putting a price on 
carbon.170 Flexibility mechanism supporters see JI as a cost-effective means to reduce 
emissions.171  However, the flexibility mechanisms are highly controversial and the 
perceived problems go directly to issues of legitimacy.   
 A number of the problems with JI can be illustrated through the Zasyadco mine 
project and that example is used below where applicable.  Many of the problems with JI are 
also problems for CDM and/or IET.  Where the problem is common to the three 
mechanisms, it is discussed in more general terms.  For the reasons mentioned above, there 
has been substantially more action in CDM than in JI, and, thus, more experience upon 
which to draw for analysis and evaluation.  Due to the similarities between the programs, 
including the wholesale importation of many CDM rules for JI and the JI rules’ reliance on 
guidance and procedures approved for CDM, CDM experience can often illuminate or 
illustrate JI problems.172 
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 JI problems fall in four categories: 1) mistargeting; 2) commodification and 
privatization; 3) impenetrability; and 4) unknowable information. 
4.1 Mistargeting 
 JI is not designed to lead and does not lead to the key goal for global warming 
mitigation – transition to a low carbon society.173  In fact, JI may actually delay the 
measures necessary for this transition.  As is true of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
generally, the aim of JI is not to leave fossil fuels in the ground, but rather to allow 
developed countries to assert compliance with Annex B commitments at the lowest cost.174  
There are several aspects to this. 
4.1.1 Short-sightedness 
 The premise of the flexibility mechanisms is that all emissions reductions made 
today are equal, no matter where or by whom they are made.  Under JI, to take the 
Zasyadco example, emissions cuts made at the mine in Donetsk are considered equivalent 
to emissions cuts that could be made at Marubeni or VEMA facilities in Japan or 
Switzerland.  In a sense – in the limited context of meeting emissions reductions goals in 
the present moment – this is a totally valid perspective.  However, with a broader view it is 
much less valid.  The JI project changes made at the previously more inefficient Zasyadco 
mine are made with well-known technology that Ukrainian regulators concerned with 
emissions reductions should arguably require Zasyadco to implement as industry standards 
progress.  These are relatively inexpensive changes, and this is why it makes sense for 
                                                                                                                                               
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1.  This comparison reveals that the CDM rules are more detailed and restrictive 
in significant respects. 
173 E.g., Larry Lohmann, Financialization, Quantism and Carbon Markets: Variations on Polyanian Themes 
28 (draft paper for New Political Economy) available at 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/document/FQCM.pdfLohmann (“Carbon credit investors in the 
financial sector, who today dominate the buyers side [], have also been repeatedly explicit that offset 
economics does not select for a transition away from fossil fuels.”); United States Government Accountability 
Office, Observations on the Potential Role of Carbon Offsets in Climate Change Legislation, Testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
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Marubeni and VEMA to fund this JI project instead of reducing emissions at their own 
facilities.  Of course, the implementation of better technology at Zasyadco represents an 
environmental improvement, but it leads to nothing else.  If no flexibility mechanism 
transaction was available to allow Marubeni and VEMA – and Japan and Switzerland –  to 
meet their emissions reductions commitments in this way, they would instead be forced to 
make cuts at their domestic facilities.  This might have entailed the development of new 
renewable energy technology, a radical new way of organizing social life, or some other 
innovation that could lead the way to greatly multiplied emissions reductions in the 
future.175 
 JI’s equal treatment of emission cuts no matter where or how they occur results in 
the cheapest cuts being made first, thus potentially delaying progress on the key mitigation 
strategy – transition from carbon energy-based societies.  Instead of encouraging long-term 
investment, innovation, and societal restructing, which are necessary if we are going to 
become a society that leaves carbon fuel in the ground, JI favors dispersed, expedient 
measures. 
4.1.2 Discouraging innovation 
 The economic argument that the flexibility mechanisms provide incentive for 
additional innovation and greater emissions cuts, as companies that can make greater cuts 
at relatively low cost can sell emissions credits for profit, appears suspect.176  While some 
polluters may have such incentive, others will have an incentive to forgo making cuts or 
investing in innovation since they can simply buy carbon credits.177  It is compellingly 
argued that emissions trading schemes like the flexibility mechanisms provide ”equal 
measure of under-compliance and over-compliance incentives, inducing less innovation 
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than a performance-based standard to which everyone has an incentive to comply.”178  
Emissions trading tends to favor low-cost solutions, which are more ”cost-efficient” only in 
the short-term, at the expense of solutions that are environmentaly (and economically) 
more efficient in the long-term.179  For example, Marubeni and VEMA have no need to 
innovate because they can make a relatively cheap investment in known technology at 
Zasyadco.  ”Emissions trading provides inferior incentives for relatively expensive 
innovation because emissions trading lowers the cost of routine compliance.”180 
 Many industry and government supporters of the flexibility mechanisms recognize 
this.  For instance, in 2005, ”leaders of major global companies representing a broad range 
of industries” released a statement favoring market approaches to global warming that 
recognized that ”the primary effect of such mechanisms is to promote efficiencies in energy 
use or manufacturing processes; they are less likely to stimulate major technological 
changes or breakthroughs.”181 
4.1.3 Encouraging host countries’ resistance to tightened commitments 
 Related is the concern that JI is likely to make future emissions reductions in host 
countries more expensive, as JI transactions will take up most cheap emissions reductions 
opportunities.182  Raising the price of future emissions reductions in JI host countries may 
well have the effect of raising their resistance to future tightening of emissions 
commitments.  Ukraine itself can not take advantage, for example, of the relatively easy 
eficiency improvement at Zasyadco to meet potentially tightened future emissions 
limitations, making the country more likely to resist more stringent caps. 
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4.1.4 Perverse incentives for host countries – disincentive to regulate 
 Some of the incentives provided through JI can only be considered perverse and 
counterproductive.  Countries with less efficient infrastructures, which are the hosts or 
potential hosts for JI projects, have a disincentive to regulatorily mandate increased 
efficiency.  If a host country’s law requires an improvement at a facility that would 
otherwise be a propect for JI carbon credits, it will be much more difficult to demonstrate 
additionality.  If the law requires the improvement, resulting emissions reductions become 
part of the baseline and can not be considered the additional result of a JI project.  Host 
countries will not want to enact such efficiency-improvement regulation because to do so 
would thus limit potential JI capital inflows.  An analogous issue is currently at play with 
proposed domestic greenhouse gas mitigation legislation in Brazil, which opponents claim 
will hamper the ability to show the additionality of CDM projects in that country.183 
 For instance, the CMM cogeneration technology, one kind of which the Zasyadco JI 
project employs, is readily available technology increasingly used (though not currently 
required) in developed countries for power generation, district heating, boiler fuel, town 
gas, and in natural gas pipeline systems.184  To do its part for global warming mitigation, it 
may well be sensible for Ukraine, the world’s third largest emitter of CMM, to at some 
point legally mandate implementation of such cogeneration technology.185  JI provides 
Ukraine with an incentive not to require this technology so that Ukrainian mines can 
continue to attract JI investment like the Zasyadco mine did.  Such incentive conflicts with 
the objective of the UNFCCC. 
4.1.5 Path dependency 
 Path dependency is the ”tendency of past or traditional practice or preference to 
continue even if better alternatives are available.”186  JI can create path dependency by 
keeping unsustainable operations in business further into the future than they would 
continue with JI investment.  The Zasyadco JI project may provide an excellent example of 
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this, as the financial projections for the project show the mine suffering financial loses until 
the mine begins to receive money from the JI transaction.187  If the JI project income is 
what allows the Zasyadco mine to be profitable and continue operating, we must ask 
whether prolonging coal mining is consistent with the UNFCCC objectives.  It is not.   
 The major problem underlying climate change is the developed world’s dependency 
on carbon-based energy and the rapid growth of the developing world, especially China 
and India, along this same path.  The objective of the international climate change effort 
should be to shift the world off of such a carbon energy paradigm.  The flexibility 
mechanisms are not directed to this end and instead allow our carbon path dependency to 
continue and, in some cases, deepen. 
 It is worth noting that data show greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized 
countries continuing to rise – at 1% in 2007, for example.188  Increases in the United States, 
Canada, and Japan are a major factor in this.189  Japan, for example, with a rise of 2.3% in 
2007, is significantly above its Annex B reduction target but may be able to satisfy its 
Annex B commitment through use of JI, CDM, and IET.190  Thus, JI may be deepening 
Japan’s path dependency and hampering its transformation. 
4.1.6 Relation of mistargeting to legitimacy 
 The mistargeting problems are serious ones with regard to substantive legitimacy.  
These problems all go to the effectiveness of JI at achieving the Kyoto Article 3 objective.  
Very significantly, as JI results in postponement of emissions reductions and structural 
change in the most advanced and richest countries, it flies in the face of the necessary 
implication of Kyoto Article 3 that the most drastic emissions cuts happen in these 
countries.  This is inconsistent with the leadership principle and with intragenerational 
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equity.  Delay in structural change, path dependency, and perverse incentives for host 
countries all contradict the principle of sustainable development.  Only in the narrow 
senses of facilitating attainment of Annex B emissions reductions commitments at a lower 
cost and, perhaps, allowing immediate emissions reductions at a lower short-term cost does 
JI serve the principle of efficiency. 
4.2 Commodification and privatization 
 All of the flexibility mechanisms require dividing the atmosphere into pieces of 
”right to pollute.”  They make the international climate change mitigation regime into 
much more of a property rights scheme than anything else.  This raises substantial moral 
and practical problems concerning fundamental equity and overall efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
4.2.1 Creation of wealth 
 Although the Marrekech Accord proclaims ”that the Kyoto Protocol has not created 
or bestowed any right, title or entitlement to emissions of any kind on Parties included in 
Annex 1,” this is, in reality, simply not so.191  Carbon credits under all of the flexibility 
mechanisms have characteristics that make them a type of property right.  They are an 
enforceable claim to do something, i.e., to emit a given amount of pollution.  They are 
enforceable rights to benefit from something, i.e., to make money by trading credits or to 
be advantaged by having credits that competitors do not.  They are tradable.  They enable 
the owner to exclude others from their use.  ”Certainly as to ownership, and legal title, is 
fundamental both to the success of the market and to ensuring that the value of the resource 
is realized by those entitled to it.”192 
 Kyoto’s dependence on the flexibility mechanisms creates huge wealth, which is 
given, mostly free of charge, to polluting nations and industries.  In the Kyoto-inspired EU 
ETS, for example, Europe’s largest industrial carbon emitter, German power company 
RWE, received a windfall of about $6.4 billion in the first three years of the EU ETS, and 
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German industries as a whole were enriched in an amount estimated as high as $374 
billion.193  Another German power company made a €650 million profit through EU ETS 
trading in 2008, and, unsurprisingly, promotes expansion of emission and offset trading.194  
Undeniably, wealth creation forms part of the motivation for perpetuation and expansion of 
the flexibility mechanisms.195  At the start of Kyoto, the parties handed out – to just the 
Annex 1 countries – more rights to emit greenhouse gases than can be allowed in total if 
the UNFCCC stabilization goal is to be attained.196  The value of these carbon credits has 
been estimated at as much as two trillion dollars.197  Although the carbon credits created in 
this round and, subsequently through JI, are of limited temporal duration, they represent 
property that will not be readily given up by the wealthy polluters, nations and others, who 
hold them. 
4.2.2 Allocation struggles 
 If the basic Kyoto structure including the flexibility mechanisms is to be 
maintained, allocation struggles are sure to be a main feature of the December 2009 
Copenhagen negotiations, as they were at Kyoto in 1997.198  Such struggles usually result 
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in over-allocation, as they did in the Kyoto negotiations and in the development of the EU 
ETS.199 
4.2.3 Rent-seeking 
 The flexibility mechanism-based Kyoto system invites ”rent-seeking behavior”: 
[t]he expenditure of resources in order to bring about an 
uncompensated transfer of goods or services from another 
person or persons to one’s self as the result of a ’favorable’ 
decision on some public policy.  ...  Examples of rent-seeking 
behavior would include all of the various ways by which 
individuals or groups lobby government for taxing, spending 
and regulatory policies that confer financial benefits or other 
special advantages upon them at the expense of the taxpayers 
or of consumers or of other groups or individuals with which 
the beneficiaries may be in economic competition.200 
 The ”rents” at stake in JI and the other flexibility mechanisms are enormous.  
Indeed, the international carbon market is pegged by the financial industry as ”the world’s 
biggest commodity market, and it could become the world’s biggest market overall,” as 
well as ”one of the fastest-growing markets ever, with volumes comparable to credit 
derivatives within a decade.”201  Many of the same individuals and financial institutional 
players involved in disasterous derivatives markets are now involved with the carbon 
market.202   
 Climate change is seen as an example of market failure203  - the wisdom of relying 
on a particularly artificial and manipulatable market for mitigation seems highly dubious.  
It can reasonably be expected that substantial amounts of effort will go into lobbying, 
lawyering, public relations campaigns, analysis, and other endeavors that have nothing to 
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do with transition to a low-carbon energy society in the course of seeking rents under this 
system.204  Exemptions and special rules will be sought, lawsuits will be fought, regulators 
will be courted and captured, and all of this will be in attempts to maximize profits from 
the JI system.205  For example, the former German minister of environment explains that 
the framework of the EU ETS put governments in the position of behaving like ”a 
grandfather with a large family deciding what to give his favorite grandchildren for 
Christmas.”206  Carbon market speculators already abound.207  It is even foreseeable that 
investments in emissions reductions will be delayed as investors wait for more favorable 
conditions in the artificial carbon markets as government policies unfold and respond to 
rent-seeking behavior.208 
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4.2.4 Distraction 
 Allocation battles and rent-seeking-induced conflicts and maneuvering deduct from 
the resources, energy, and attention needed from governments, industry, NGOs, and the 
public to make the difficult and costly transition that is necessary for successful mitigation.  
Political space needed for education, planning, and movement-building is sucked up by the 
battle resulting from commodification.  Thinking about human rights and considering how 
to lessen the distorting influence of power imbalances on collective decision-making would 
be more productive than the distracting focus on markets, carbon trading instruments, and 
money.209  Real, compelling human stories about Arctic peoples losing their subsistance 
cultures, island nations threatened with submersion, or Bangladeshi environmental 
refugees, among others, have little place in discussion of flexibility mechanisms. 
4.2.5 Relation of commodification and privatization to legitimacy 
 The commodification and privatization problems are all about substantive 
legitimacy.  The creation of wealth problem can be seen to violate all of the equity-based 
principles.  It is repugnant to any notion of equity that polluters profit from a scheme 
purportedly intended to reduce pollution.  The violation of the polluter pays principle is the 
most direct – here, the polluters get paid and then buy their way out of making difficult 
changes for climate change mitigation. 
 The allocation and rent-seeking problems tend to make JI ineffective by creating a 
lot of unproductive activity and creating a drag on the design benefits of the flexibility 
mechanisms.  Only in a perverted sense is money and effort that polluters spend on 
allocation struggles and rent-seeking part of the treaty’s notion of ”cost-effective.”  All of 
the gamesmanship – rent-seeking, allocation battles, and controversy about flexibility 
mechanism rules – in reality has little to do with the core problem.  By directing energy and 
attention to these things, JI plays a role in diverting efforts to address climate change on the 
level of human rights.  Not only do human rights suffer from the results of climate change 
that JI fails to help stem, but they also struggle with the lack of oxygen from the flexibility 
mechanisms’ heavy breathing. 
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4.3 Unknowable information 
 High monitoring, reporting, and verification standards are crucial for the success of 
carbon trading schemes,210 yet JI depends on unknowable information.  The monitoring and 
quantification required is not possible at current levels of technological sophistication.  
Even with improved monitoring abilities, some information upon which the integrity of JI 
depends will never be knowable with an acceptable level of certainty.  These problems are 
compounded by substantial potential for cheating and corruption, political resistance to 
disclosure,211 and difficulties of enforcement. 
4.3.1 Limitations of monitoring 
 Techniques for measuring carbon dioxide emissions and removals even in the most 
technologically advanced countries do not have a high degree of accuracy.  Climate change 
expert Steve Rayner asserts that flexibility mechanisms ”rely on underdeveloped 
monitoring and accounting systems that inevitably leave plenty of wiggle room for 
unscrupulous speculators to work the system, amassing fortunes while achieving nothing 
for the atmosphere.”212  One author estimates uncertainty rates for worldwide emissions, 
noting that national measurements are typically more uncertain (except for fossil fuel 
CO2).213  These worldwide uncertainty rates range from a low of ten per cent for CO2 
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels up to over one hundred per cent for some 
methane sources.214  Measurement deficiencies are partially responsible for the 
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overallocation of carbon credits in the EU ETS.215  While the IPCC is at work to improve 
national and worldwide inventories, ”no internationally agreed methodologies or rules for 
estimating the greenhouse gas or CO2 balances at a company level exist, in particular for 
the purpose of emission trading ....”216 
4.3.2 Arbitrary equivalencies 
 Another substantial measurement uncertainty comes into JI in the form of 
equivalency.  Greenhouse gases are regulated under Kyoto and JI carbon credits are 
available with respect to all of them.  The regulated gases are CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, 
and three groups of flourinated gases (sulfur hexaflouride, HFCs, and PFCs) .  However, 
Annex B commitments and the flexibility mechanisms all operate only on the basis of tons 
of CO2 emissions.  Emissions or reductions of the other gases are converted, for 
accounting purposes, into CO2 metric ton equivalents.  For example, the value for methane 
is 23, for nitrous oxide 296, and for HFC-134a 1,300.  Thus, a reduction of one ton of 
methane by a JI project is converted to 23 tons of CO2 emissions reduction equivalent for 
accounting.  These equivalency values are based on calculations with much uncertainty and 
arbitrariness.217 
4.3.3 Additionality 
 Besides these measurement uncertainties, another very substantial problem lurks.  
That is ensuring additionality – that the emissions reductions or sink enhancement involved 
in a JI project would not take place but for the JI project.  They are ”additional” to what 
would happen in the business as usual baseline.  It is simply not possible to place a great 
deal of faith in this additionality concept, which necessarily relies upon proof of a 
counterfactual – the baseline against which project emissions performance is measured 
exists only in an imaginary parallel universe, so additionality can never be proven. 
 A showing of additionality involves comparision of what one hopes will happen 
with the project to what one guesses would have happened without the project – if one is 
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honest.218  The setting of baselines presents many opportunities for cheating that may be 
particularly hard to detect because of the nature of additionality tests.  Determinations of 
additionality are necessarily subjective because baseline definition always requires choices 
and assumptions that can not be verified in the real world.219    It is not possible to reliably 
determine additionality for this reason.220  There are many ways to cheat.  Baseline 
scenarios seem easy to fudge.  Consultants can troll for companies planning or required to 
make improvements in efficiency and have them hold off until a JI deal for these same 
improvements is arranged.  Even without malfeasance, additionality rules and tests do not 
work as well in economies in transition as they would in an established market economy 
because of a transition economy’s unclear rules of the game and the potentially significant 
impact on decision-making of personal relations or practices leftover from the previous 
economic system.221   
 The Zasyadco mine project, for example, includes dubious assumptions in its 
baseline selection and additionality demonstration.  The PDD concludes that ”continuation 
of the existing situation which is to vent CMM into the atmosphere, generate heat with the 
existing boiler, purchase of electiricy from the grid and continue fuel the vehicle (sic) with 
diesel” is the only realistic option for a baseline.222  The alternative to feed CMM into the 
existing natural gas pipeline for offsite electricity and heat generation is considered but 
rejected as a possible baseline because of ”absence of prevailing practices to utilize CMM” 
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and a high investment requirement. 223  However, the following page of the PDD states that 
Zasyadco did in fact supply CMM to the natural gas grid of Donetsk in 2006 while 
implementation of the JI project was delayed.224   No explanation is provided to reconcile 
this discrepancy.  Had use of the CMM in the Donetsk natural gas grid been considered the 
baseline instead of the older practice of merely venting the CMM, the emissions reduction 
figures would presumably been significantly lower, if reductions even continued to exist at 
all.   
 A highly questionable financial assumption found in the Zasyadco documentation 
also illustrates the subjectivity of additionality determinations.  The PDD provides an 
investment analysis to show that the Zasyadco CMM cogeneration project is not financially 
feasible without JI revenues.225  A major factor in this is the projected energy cost savings 
from the cogeneration project.226  If the net present value (”NPV”) of energy savings were 
high enough, then it would make sense for the mine to undertake the cogeneration project 
even without JI revenues, leaving very doubtful the project’s additionality.  For the 
calculations, the PDD uses 2003 prices for electricity, heat, and gas, and shows a sensitivity 
analysis projecting project returns if the price of the biggest piece of the energy savings, 
electricity, increased or decreased by twenty percent.227  When the price of electricity is 
projected to increase by this amount, the rate of investment return estimate nearly triples 
and the NPV, although still shown to be negative, improves by a factor of five.228  If 
electricity costs increased enough, the cogeneration project would have a positive NPV and 
would fail to show additionality through investment analysis.  While energy prices paid by 
the Zasyadco mine are unavailable, there is a good likelihood that they have in fact 
increased more than twenty percent since 2003, perhaps substantially more, at least if 
household rates provide any indication.  Perhaps due at least in part to the approximate 
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quadroupling of the price Ukraine pays to Russia for natural gas, a large component of the 
source of Ukrainian electricity, household electricty rates increased approximately fifty 
percent in 2006 alone, even with substantial subsidization.229 
 Empirical studies of the far more numerous CDM projects reveal very troublesome 
problems with additionality demonstrations.  Lambert Schneider published a report in 
November 2007 for WWF in which he evaluated 93 randomly chosen CDM projects and 
conducted interviews and a literature survey.230  Using generous assumptions, the report 
estimates that for about 40% of the registered CDM projects, additionality is unlikely or 
questionable.231  Schneider’s literature review cites a survey on long-term prospects of 
CDM and JI of individuals from business, research, governments, and multilateral and non-
governmental organizations, including project developers, in which 71% agreed with the 
statement that ”many CDM projects would also be implemented without registration under 
the CDM” and 86% affirmed that ”in many cases, carbon revenues are the icing on the 
cake, but are not decisive for the investment decision.”232   
 Scheider’s study provides detailed analysis of the three types of additionality 
analysis required by the CDM additionality tool: barrier analysis, investment analysis, and 
common practice analysis.233  Schneider rigorously shows barrier analysis, which is based 
on existence of barriers that would prevent project execution without CDM registration, to 
be ”highly subjective, vague and difficult to validate in an objective and transparent 
manner.”234  All kinds of vague situations are called barriers and often no explanation is 
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provided as to why or as to how CDM registration helps overcome the so-called barrier.235  
Investment analysis, like that for Zasyadco discussed above, is to show that the project is 
less economically attractive than at least one credible alternative.236  Among the ”highly 
varied” quality of investment analysis, Scheider found that some projects provide detailed 
and transparent analysis while others use a ”black-box approach,” leaving calculations and 
assumptions unreviewable.237  Common practice analysis looks at the extent to which the 
proposed project type has been used in the geographical and sectoral area as proposed.238  
Its main problems are that a threshold for common practice and comparable technologies 
both remain undefined.239 
 Another empirical study, by Barbara Haya, completed in 2007 for International 
Rivers, evaluates the additionality of hydropower CDM projects.240  Looking at Chinese 
hydropower policy and the timing of dam construction versus CDM timelines, Haya 
concludes that there should be no question that the majority of Chinese CDM hydropower 
projects are non-additional.241 
 Another study by Haya found that all four of the sugar mill cogeneration projects 
examined were to be built with or without CDM project approval.242  ”These CDM project 
developers seem to view the CDM as a potential additional source of profits for projects 
they were already planning to build, and the additionality test as a hoop they must jump 
through to access those funds.”243 
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 A final study examined various CDM projects in India and found the same kinds of 
problems that Schneider did.244  The two detailed case studies performed in this report 
show that ”packaging” – the characterization of the project’s additionality in the PDD – is 
what distinguished between the CDM Executive Board’s approval of one non-additional 
project and its rejection of another.245 
 The JI rules are looser than those for CDM.  A close reading of the JI rules reveals 
that they can render additionality yet more dubious.  The three tests required under the 
CDM additionality tool are not necessary under the JI rules because use of CDM tool is 
only one of five options available to ”demonstrate additionality.”246  A troublesome option 
is  
Provision of traceable and transparent information showing 
that the baseline was identified on the basis of conservative 
assumptions, that the project scenario is not part of the 
identified baseline scenario and that the project will lead to 
reductions of anthropogenic emissions by sources or 
enhancements of net anthropogenic removals by sinks of 
GHGs ....247 
 Thus, a demonstration of additionality requires only a comparision of emissions in 
the baseline to projected emissions in the project scenario.  The JI rules and guidance 
require that the baseline ”reasonably represent[]” emissions or removals ”that would occur 
in the absence of the proposed project,” but include no firm and clear provisions to test 
whether the proposed project would take place but for JI funding.248  The comparison of 
”emissions without project” (baseline scenario) to ”emissions with project” (project 
scenario) needs no determination that the project would not happen without the JI 
mechanism.   
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4.3.4 Corruption potential 
 Cross-jurisdictional emissions trading systems may generally encourage weak 
enforcement and corruption, due to the opportunity for unethical government officials to 
simultaneously enrich themselves and home-state enterprises.249  In this light, the notorious 
corruption in the two countries with the greatest potential to host JI projects, Russia and 
Ukraine, is alarming.  JI presents potential to export corruption from these countries to 
contaminate Kyoto Annex B accounting worldwide.   
 Russia’s JI approval procedures are ”characterized by bureaucracy and 
vagueness.”250  They provide no firm project requirements and reserve the regulators’ right 
to dismiss projects and withhold carbon credit transfer after project approval for reasons 
”considered fit by the Russian Government.”251  Regulations of this nature are not, shall we 
say, designed to discourage corruption. 
 According to one respected Russian NGO’s report, the Russian state itself is ”the 
country’s biggest racketeer.”252  Many international organizations have charted the 
”staggering extent” of corruption in Russia.253  As of 2008, Russia rates ”very weak” 
overall in the Global Integrity Index.254   
 Administrative and grand corruption are widespread in Ukraine.255  It is a ”country 
strongly influenced by elite cartels,” where the corrupt environment presents ”a clear 
obstacle to future sustainable economic growth and integration into the European Union 
and world economy.”256  Under-the-table deals, collusion between state officials and 
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business, and rent-seeking behavior characterize this environment.257  As of 2007, it rates 
”weak” overall in the Global Integrity Index.258 
 Though the problems with the baseline-setting for the Zasyadco mine project 
described above affect both the additionality determination and the calculation of carbon 
credit numbers, the author is aware of no real evidence of corrupt practices with respect to 
this  project.  However, the circumstances of the mine’s ownership demonstrate potential.  
A substantial interest in the Zasyadco mine is controlled by Mr. Yukhym Zvyahiliskyy, 
who is not only a current Ukrainian MP, but also a former Donetsk mayor and acting Prime 
Minister of Ukraine.259  In 1994, Mr. Zvyahiliskyy, a prominent figure in the ”Donetsk 
clan” of powerful regional businessmen, faced an investigation of allegations that he had 
stolen twenty million dollars, and fled his government post and Ukraine for two years.260 
 Falsification of baseline information, or a little fudging to make improvements to be 
funded through the JI mechanism appear untenable without it, seems likely in these places.  
Indeed, the general vulnerability of of baseline and credit systems to data manipulation has 
been noted, and falsification of documents in the CDM has been alleged based on 
examinations.261  In addition, falsification of information about stakeholder consulations 
has been documented in CDM projects in India.262  Probably, approval paperwork can be 
purchased from state regulators.   
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4.3.5 Lack of enforcement 
 The market for JI carbon credits has another aspect that increases the potential for 
fraud.  In a normal market, a buyer has a firm incentive to ensure the appropriate quality of 
the goods purchased, and that he receives what the what the seller represented.  In the JI 
market, the buyer has no built-in reason to care about the quality of the ”goods,” but only 
that the JI carbon credits are accepted as valid.  Both buyer and seller in this market share 
the incentive to have the JI project count for as many carbon credits as possible.263  Thus, a 
fraud prevention mechanism inherent in normal markets is absent in the JI carbon credit 
market.  That less information and resources are available to the watchdog of the system, 
the JI Supervisory Committee, than to project parties compounds this problem, as does the 
lack of any Comittee record of punishing misconduct.264 
 Indeed, a JI funder has an incentive to invest in a project in a country that is unable 
or unwilling to accurately measure emissions reductions.265  With a JI project located in 
such a country, it is easier to claim higher reductions and obtain more carbon credits or less 
expensive ones. 
 In addition, that JI projects are implemented by private sector actors to such a great 
extent, a novel way to implement international law, highlights the lack of means to enforce 
international standards and safeguards as a problem.266  There is no agreement on the extent 
to which such non-state actors are appropriate subjects of international law.267  Since the JI 
Supervisory Committee lacks adequate powers, this enforcement is supposed to take place 
at the national level.  The integrity and quality of JI projects, particularly with respect to 
long-term impacts on energy policy and to sustainable development, is left to individual 
host countries’ decisions consistent with the principle of sovereignty. 
 Provisions for enforcement in JI focus on AIE accreditation, which can be 
suspended or withdrawn if an AIE is found to no longer meet accreditation standards upon 
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JI Supervisory Committee review.268  Once a JI project carbon credits are verified, they 
cannot be unverified, although an AIE can be made to aquire replacement carbon credits if 
it verified JI project carbon credits in excess of amounts provided by the rules as a result of 
a deficiency for which the AIE’s accreditation has been suspended or withdrawn.269  The 
problem with this enforcement authority, besides its narrow focus, is in the apparent lack of 
JI Steering Committee enforcement capacity and the lack of a procedure for initiation of 
enforcement review.   
4.3.6 Relationship of unknowable information to legitimacy 
 The unknowable information problems are primarily ones of procedural legitimacy, 
however they all go also to the effectiveness and environmental integrity of JI.  The 
limitations of monitoring and the arbitrariness of the greenhouse gas warming potential 
figures tend to make operation of JI opaque to anyone but experts, in addition to their 
potential impacts on actual achievement of emissions reductions.  Even just the apparent 
potential for corruption, especially when coupled with the deficiencies in enforcement 
authority, are blows to transparency. 
 The additionality problems present a particular issue with regard to the 
precautionary principle as JI’s (and CDM’s) treatment of additionality inappropriately 
applies the burden of proof.  Unless additionality can be proven with a reasonable degree of 
certainty, the precautionary principle should operate to prevent a polluter with 
undiminished emissions from claiming satisfaction of emissions reductions commitments 
on the basis of a purported offset.   Due to the heavy uncertainty invoved in additionality, if 
it cannot be shown that the activity – in this case the undiminished emitting ”offset” by a JI 
or CDM project – can go foward without adverse environmental impact, it should not be 
permitted.  Contrary to the precautionary principle, JI (and CDM) treat the necessarily 
subjective additionality determination with a liberal benefit of the doubt.  In a sense, JI (and 
CDM) use this fault in burden of proof to partially subvert the broader attempt of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto to apply the precautionary principle to the climate change problem as 
a whole. 
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4.4 Impenetrability 
 As a centerpiece of the Kyoto effort, the flexibility mechanisms are simply too 
complex and opaque to facilitate healthy public participation.  The entire process is plagued 
with a lack of transparency and accountability safeguards.  Emissions trading systems 
generally tend to be especially complex to the point of disabling public participation and 
leaving them vulnerable to industry lobbying.270  Emissions trading markets are derivatives 
markets – somewhat resembling the markets to which are commonly attributed the current 
financial crisis – and characteristically non-transparent.271   
 The failure of JI to adequately engage the public is evident from the astoundingly 
low numbers of public comments received on PDDs.  As has been noted with respect to 
CDM as well, NGOs have been fairly inactive in commenting on PDDs.272  It is no wonder 
– JI is filled with hyper-technical concepts and jargon, requirements for solicitiation of 
public participation are minimal, and the significance and role of the whole system is hard 
to grasp. 
4.4.1 EIA standards 
 The requirements and standards for environmental impact assessment are very 
loose.  There is no standard to determine when environmental impacts are ”significant,” 
thus requiring such assessment.  ”This means that if a country has minimal environmental 
protection standards, or has good standards with a flexible enforcement, or concludes that a 
JI project’s negative environmental impacts are not significant, JI may be used to finance 
[greenhouse gas] mitigation projects which may not be sustainable with a view to [non-
greenhouse gas] environmental impacts.”273  For instance, two wind power JI projects in 
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Bulgaria that presented potential for serious adverse impact on Important Bird Areas 
escaped adequate EIA as facilitated by Bulgarian law.274   
 The JI guidelines do not mention environmental impacts in describing PDD 
requirements, and PDDs generally pay little attention to the matter.275  The JISC rules rely 
too much on host country requirements, and provide no recourse if host country 
environmental impact assessment laws are violated.  In this way, deficiencies in host 
country requirements are exported to the Kyoto system, certainly to the detriment, in some 
cases, of Kyoto’s sustainable development goals.  It is reasonable to think that a similar 
situation in the CDM requirements contributed significantly to the documented failure of 
CDM to result in sustainable development.276  While abstaining from imposing 
requirements or standards on countries in this regard serves the important principle of 
sovereignty, it runs the risk of seriously impairing the environmental integrity of JI.   
 Examination of a number of the PDDs for JI projects recently open for comment, 
exemplifies the problem.  For a project to construct wind power turbines on the Lithuanian 
coast, no EIA was prepared and impacts on birds, a common concern with facilities of this 
type, were mentioned only in two brief paragraphs of the PDD with general, conclusorily 
dismissive statments.277  For a project to construct a hydropower dam in Russia, no 
separate EIA was prepared and the PDD includes virtually no information about the river 
affected.278  The entirety of the conclusion about significance of the environmental impacts 
provided in section F.2. of the PDD provides the only references to population resettlement 
and acheological damage, inviting questions at the very least: 
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On the basis of materials submitted to AIE, it was concluded 
that the project activities do not produce essential impact on 
the natural environment.  The damage from construction 
related to resettlement of the population and transposition of 
archeological valuable (sic) from the flooded territory was 
reimbursed.279 
4.4.2 Availability of information 
 Project-specific information required to be publicly available, including the PDD 
upon which stakeholders may comment, need only be provided in English.  There is no JI 
requirement that the information be disseminated in the language used by the locally 
affected community or stakeholders, and there is no requirement that it be made available 
in a culturally appropriate and practical way.  If stakeholders do not have internet access or 
pay attention to the UNFCCC JI website, they may miss the opportunity for public 
comment altogether, even if they can understand English.   
 Furthermore, the JI rules’ exemption from disclosure for confidentiality is quite 
loose.  Any information that project participants designate as propriety or confidential – 
without need for explaination as to the reason for such designation –  remains undisclosed 
absent the written consent of the provider of the information, except as required by 
applicable host country domestic law.280  The only information that may not be withheld as 
confidential at the discretion of the participants is that used to determine additionality, to 
describe baseline methodology and its application, and to support an environmental impact 
assessment.281  The opportunity to withhold information as confidential may lead some 
project developers to seek out potential host countries with the least restrictive 
confidentiality laws. 
4.4.3 Lack of judicial review 
 JI rules provide no opportunities to stakeholders to seek redress if public 
information or participation requirements are violated.  There is no mechanism allowing 
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stakeholders to register complaints about the procedures, impacts of specific projects, or 
actions of AIEs.   
4.4.4 Rules allow unanswered questions 
 The JI Supervisory Committee’s addtionality guidance’s allowance of use of a 
”comparable project,” or sector-wide, additionality detemination compounds the 
fundamental unknowable information projects with the additionality concept.282  For 
instance, the questionable methodology used for the Zasyadco JI project may now be 
available for use by CMM JI projects throughout Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the 
Zasyadco project approval.  Any fudging or false ”conservative” assumption built into the 
initial sector-wide baseline calculation would be carried on to successive projects using that 
baseline.  For the sake of efficiency and getting projects done, the sector-wide baseline 
concept seems to reduce additionality testing to a mere formality. 
 In addition, ambiguous guidelines on establishing a project boundary for purposes 
of baseline setting provide room for fudging.  The project boundary must include emission 
sources that are under the project’s control, ”reasonably attributable” to the project, and 
”significant,” using a ”rule of thumb” that allows exclusion of sources under 2,000 tons of 
CO2 equivalent or that average less than one percent (per potentially outside-of-boundary 
source under consideration) of anthropogenic sources, whichever is lower.283  These criteria 
are loosened yet further by the direction to set the project boundary ”with regard to these 
criteria.”284  Even after the substantial subjectivity allowed by this guidance, sources can be 
excluded from the baseline – for no reason that the guidelines specify – so long as such 
exclusion is justified.285  Baseline fudging can be virally compounded through the 
allowance for use of a ”multi-project emission factor” – based on similarity of ”sector,” but 
also open to other unspecified similarity.286 
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 Measuring and accounting for leakage, greenhouse gas additions or removals that 
occur outside the defined JI project boundary, is another area with significant potential for 
slippage in accuracy of the JI accounting system.  Only leakage that ”can be measured and 
is directly attributable to the JI project” needs to be included in the JI project’s greenhouse 
gas balance sheet.287  These are loose standards, for example leaving unanswered questions 
about the level of effort or expense that must be expended before leakage can be deemed 
unmeasurable, and how directly ”directly attributable” must be.  Furthermore, leakage can 
be ”neglected” in unspecified circumstances.288 
 For monitoring, the rules do not specify allowable methodologies and permit use of 
default values with minimal limitations.289  Two subtly different methods to calculate 
emissions reductions are authorized, providing options for maxization of emissions 
reduction estimates.290 
 ”Fast Track JI” removes a number of existing safeguards. 
In the case of  Track 1, the verification procedure under the 
[JI Supervisory Committee] is not mandatory.  The host 
country can follow its own national guidelines and 
procedures for the approval of JI project, verification of the 
emission reductions, and transfer of ERUs.  Thus the 
additionality of a JI project, quality of the information 
provided in the PDD, and the methodology used for 
esmitating emissions reductions resulting from the project are 
evaluated by the host party.  This means that a project owner 
is not obliged to pass the verification procedure under [JI 
Supervisory Committee] and pay to the [JI Supervisory 
Committee] for determination of PDD and reductions 
accrued by the project, nor does it have to abide by [JI 
Supervisory Committee] methodological guidance.291 
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 In sum, the rules allow plenty of room for creative and crafty JI project consultants 
to use overly favorable assumptions or otherwise fudge calculations or estimations to make 
JI project look better than they are, and to hide this manipulation in the complexity of the 
analysis. 
4.4.5 Conflicts of interest 
 The JI system is rife with conflicts of interest.  Not only do the JI project carbon 
credit buyers and sellers share an interest in maximizing the number of credits verified for a 
project, so do the AIEs that verify them under Track 2.  An AIE is paid by the project 
participants and may also be a primary consultant on the project that it verifies. 
Maximizing JI project carbon credits is good for an AIE’s business, so long as it does not 
suffer accreditation suspension or withdrawal.  The accreditation stadards include 
operational requirements designed to prevent conflicts of interest but the declarations and 
demonstrations required need not be opened to public inspection.292 
 The JI Supervisory Committee rules are insufficient to prevent conflicts of interest 
for its own board members.  The Committee has no guidelines for actual or perceived 
conflict of interest determination, and issues around arising potential conflicts are left to the 
discretion of its members.  There has been recent controversy over such issues about the 
workings of the CDM Executive Board, which operates under a conflict rule substantively 
identical to that of the JI Supervisory Committee.293  There is evidence that some CDM 
Executive Board members have given favorable treatment in consideration of proposed 
CDM projects involving home countries, consultants from home countries, or former 
employers.294  The CDM Executive Board operates largely through off-the-record 
proceedings due to members’ fears of prosecution through libel litigation or otherwise, as 
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the members have no been provided with no legal protection from retribution by companies 
with investments at stake.295  This contributes to the lack of confidence in the Board 
members’ ethical integrity.  There is little reason why these same issues would not arise 
with respect to the operations of the JI Supervisory Committee, though it has substantially 
less project-specific work than the CDM Executive Board.   
4.4.6 Diluting emissions reduction commitments 
 On a deeper level, the flexibility mechanisms dimish the degree of international 
accountability available under the treaties, even removing from consideration all issues 
concerning additionality.296  While Annex B establishes meaningful commitments, by 
allowing an Annex 1 country to satisfy its commitments through emissions reductions (or 
simple trading under Kyoto Article 17), the flexibility mechanisms cloud any effort at 
accountability by adding substantial vagueness to what exactly the Annex B commitments 
mean.297  To what necessary structural evolution towards a low-carbon society does a 
developed country commit when it can meet its emissions reductions obligations by paying 
for offsets in other countries?   
4.4.7 Relationship of impenetrability to legitimacy 
 The impenetrability problems are mostly but not entirely ones of procedural 
legitimacy.  The consequences of weak standards concerning environmental impact 
assesment, availability of information, and judicial review are that the basic elements of 
public participation are unsatisfied.  The vagueness of the JI rules and the potential for 
conflicts of interest really hurt transparency as no outsiders can really see and trust JI 
decisionmaking.  To the extent that emissions reductions commitments are diluted, 
substantive legitimacy principles of equity, effectiveness, and environmental integrity are 
implicated.  Questions about the relationship of the flexibility mechanisms to justice, 
equity, and sustainable development are significant ones, and the goal or principle of cost-
effectiveness may not override these or other applicable principles.298 
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5 Fixing JI’s legitimacy 
5.1 JI problems are ones of procedural and substantive legitimacy 
 JI suffers from a serious legimacy deficit.  Many of the problems described above 
relate squarely to legitimacy and the principles it comprises.  Although as the ”little 
brother” among the three flexibility mechanisms, JI has received scant individual attention, 
the flexibility mechanisms in general (and CDM in particular) have been subject to 
scathing criticism and substantial popular objection.299  People even rally in protest against 
carbon markets.300 
 Each of JI’s problems described above goes directly to one or more principles of 
procedural and/or substantive legitimacy.  Although JI and the flexibility mechanisms may 
appear to many at first to be a sound basis for a global warming mitigation framework, 
those who attempt to engage the system or examine it more closely are likely to come away 
with many questions and doubts.     
5.2 Possible improvements 
5.2.1 Use of Gold Standard 
 The Gold Standard Foundation is a Swiss NGO that certifies carbon credits that 
meet specified requirements.  Gold Standard certification is seen as the highest standard in 
the world and widely endorsed.301  The key principle of Gold Standard certification is use 
of ”a bottom-up and integrated approach to project design.”302  The process emphasizes 
enhanced public participation to identify project impacts with tools such as a sustainable 
development matrix, stakeholder consultation guidelines, and monitoring plan 
requirements.  It endorses principles of transparency and a conservative approach – EIAs 
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are required and non-sustainable projects may be rejected.303  Projects must be shown to 
provide benefits overall in twelve indicators of sustainable development categories of 
environment, social development, and economic and techinlogical development.304  Gold 
Standard limits acceptable project types to exclude several categories of the most 
problematic projects:  only CO2, methane, and/or nitrous oxide projects are allowed, and 
only renewable energy supply and end-use energy efficiency improvement projects are 
allowed.305  Gold Standard does, however, rely heavily on use of approved CDM 
methodologies, including those for additionality, which have failed to safeguard against 
dubious projects.306  It also requires project review by an ”independent third party 
Validator,” which must be an appropriately accredited DOE or AIE, which would 
essentially eliminate ”fast track JI” (Track 1), which relies solely on host country 
validation.307  Annual verification by a different DOE or AIE is mandatory.308 
 International law could require that JI projects meet Gold Standard requirements by 
incorporating the requirements into treaty or the JI rules.  This would represent a significant 
improvement for JI by ameliorating a number of its problems, particularly those related to 
public consultation and input.  It would also provide greater assurance that JI projects 
would contribute to sustainable development. 
 Key problems would remain, however, even if all JI projects had to meet the Gold 
Standard.  Gold Standard certification does nothing to address issues of additionality and 
little to relieve mistargeting and commodification and privatization problems. 
5.2.2 Improving oversight 
 Enhancing the role, capacity, and structural integrity of the JI Supervisory 
Committee could also enhance JI’s legitimacy.  Committee members could be provided 
with legal protection from liability for their official actions.  Their work could then be 
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performed transparently and, if provided with strengthened conflict of interest rules and 
mechanisms for conflict review and enforcement, the Committee’s credibility would be 
enhanced.  The Committee could be given greater resources, funded through state 
contributions or increased project fees, and increase expertise and capacity to review 
projects.   
 To eliminate conflicts of interest for AIEs who are currently paid by project 
participants to validate projects, the current AIE functions could be taken over by the 
Committee.  Alternatively, AIEs could be paid by the Committee and assigned at random 
or through another method that does not give project participants leverage over AIEs’ 
decision-making. 
5.2.3 Public participation 
 Several improvements in the realm of public participation would enhance JI’s 
legitimacy.  First, international law could set minimum standards for environmental impact 
assessment, based on Aarhus and Espoo Convention requirements for when and how to do 
EIA.  Associated with this could be enhanced and timely public notification, better defined 
opportunities for public comment open to all, and mandatory consideration and response to 
public comment.   
 While improvements of this nature may provoke sovereignty-based objections from 
some treaty parties, the requirements would only apply when a state choses to participate in 
JI.  It seems appropriate that participation in an optional program established by 
international law may have such conditions reasonably related to the core of its objectives 
and consistent with emerging international norms concerning public participation.  If 
countries do not want to follow such requirements for projects within their borders, they 
would be free to pursue such projects without obtaining carbon credits under the 
international treaty system.  Thus, the impingement on sovereignty is an acceptable one. 
 Another improvement would be adoption of procedures and institutions to allow 
members of the public to challenge project approvals to an appellate board and to petition 
for enforcement in the form of de-certification of carbon credits and/or suspension of rule-
breaking AIEs or other actors.   
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5.2.4 Supplementarity 
 The Kyoto supplementarity requirement could be given a firmer, restrictive 
definition, allowing flexibility mechanism use to satisfy only a small, fixed percentage of 
Annex B commitments.  This would limit the potential damage of flexibility mechanism 
overuse to the integrity of these commitments, as well, probably, of the other problems they 
present by putting real limits on overall flexibility mechanism use.   
 Without other reforms, however, stricter supplementarity could have undesirable 
consequences for JI and CDM project quality.  Stricter supplementarity would limit 
demand for carbon credits from these projects, increasing emphasis on the cheapest 
projects – those least likely to be truly additional.309 
5.3 Can these improvements suffice? 
 Taken alone, none of these improvements to JI is likely to satisfactorily resolve JI’s 
legitimacy deficit.  Each would leave untouched significant portions of the problems 
described. 
 The improvements fall into two broad categories:  improving JI, and limiting its use 
(through a supplementarity standard).  None of the improvements gets to the heart of the 
crucial additionality problem, or to considerations of equity associated with the 
commodification and privatization problems.  Indeed, these problems are inherent in JI and 
all allocation and offset schemes.  Restricting the scale of the flexibility mechanisms 
through a supplementarity standard could somewhat limit the magnitude of these problems. 
 From another perspective, adding safeguards may increase complexity, time, 
uncertainty, and cost to the system, making the process bureaucratic and burdensome and 
leading to efficiency reductions and losses in the effectiveness of JI to reduce costs.310  This 
could be expected to reduce the number of JI projects.311  JI market and project participants 
already complain about bureaucracy, slowness, and standards perceived to be rather 
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tough.312  Transaction costs (costs other than price) are a source of friction that diminish the 
cost-effectivenss of an emissions trading system.313  The JI improvements considered here 
are generally likely to increase transaction costs, potentially greatly, which means that they 
will be opposed by proponents of JI. 
6 Conclusion 
 The flexibility mechanisms in general and Joint Implementation in particular 
present many problems that substantially harm their legitimacy.  These problems can be 
categorized as mistargeting, commodification and privatization, impenetrability, and 
unknowable information.  In all, these problems go to every aspect of procedural and 
substantive legitimacy.  As is, Joint Implementation is unlikely to be viewed as a valid way 
to mitigate global warming and will probably be viewed by many – especially those non-
project participants closest to the system – as counterproductive and wrong.   
 While many of these problems could be addressed by improving JI institutions and 
rules, some are inherent and can only be somewhat mitigated by limiting JI’s scale of use.  
As one set of improvements will increase transaction costs while the other 
(supplementarity) places outright limits on the mechanism’s use, the improvements will 
probably be unacceptable to the proponents of flexibility mechanisms.  If they are 
implemented, JI may no longer be sufficiently attractive to project participants to fulfill 
anyone’s desires. 
 In conclusion, the problems with JI and the flexibility mechanisms are probably too 
great to achieve both legitimacy and viability.  It makes sense to abandon JI in pursuit of 
other means to mitigate climate change and provide sustainable development for would-be 
host countries.  If Kyoto’s current state-allocation and trading framework is to be retained, 
it seems more promising to shift the focus to green investment schemes, in which money 
received by a developing or transitioning country for carbon credits is commited to use for 
emissions reduction or sustainable development.  Better yet, the framework could be 
scrapped and the international effort refocused on mandatory national emissions reduction 
                                               
312 McGarrity, supra note 157. 
313 TIETENBERG, supra note 79, at 41. 
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efforts, major state investment in and encouragement of innovation, and North to South 
resource transfer for sustainable development. 
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